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The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona Govern-
ing Committee v. Norris,1 issued on July 6, 1983, requires 
employers to convert to sex-neutral systems for payment 
of employee retirement annuity and pension benefits. In 
Norris, the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.,2 as amended, prohibits the use of sex-based 
actuarial tables to calculate sex-differentiated employee 
retirement benefits.3 This prohibition applies whether 
the employer provides retirement benefits through self-
insurance or funds its plan through an insurance contract 
with an outside insurer.4 Both public and private 
employer must abide by the decision, but insurance or 
annuities obtained outside of the employment context 
cannot be reached under Title VII and hence are outside 
the prohibition. 
Many employers, particularly those with self-
insured plans, converted to sex-neutral systems5 prior to 
Norris because of numerous cases foreshadowing the 
Court's decision, including the Supreme Court's 1978 
landmark decision in Los Angeles Dept. of Uilter & 
l. 103 S.Ct.3492 (1983). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
3. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides: 
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer (1) to ... discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation ... because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
or (2) ... limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities ... because of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
4. Employee pension plans are typically funded through either a 
group annuity contract offered by a life insurance company, called an 
insured plan, or through a trust established by an employer and ad-
ministered through a bank or trust company, sometimes called a 
trusteed or noninsured plan. See A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRIVATE PENSIONS 216-17 (1982). 
5. According to a recent survey by the National Association of State 
Budget Officers, by early 1983, the following 37 states had adopted 
sex-neutral actuarial tables for their primary state employee retire-
ment plans: Alaska (Jan. 1981); Arizona (1976); Arkansas (1957); 
California (July 1982); Colorado (Jan. 1980); Connecticut (Oct. 
1982); Delaware (since inception of plan); Hawaii (July 1982); Idaho 
(Jan. 1979); Illinois (Sept. 1961); Indiana (ca 1980); Iowa (Nov. 1979); 
Kansas (date unknown); Louisiana (1970); Maine (late 1960); 
Maryland (Jan. 1981); Michigan (1982); Minnesota (1977); Mississip-
pi (July 1980); Missouri (197211977); Montana (1979); Nevada (June 
1982); New Hampshire (1982); New Jersey (July 1979); North 
Carolina (1981); North Dakota (1977); Ohio (Apr. 1983); Oregon 
(1978); South Carolina (Jan. 1982); South Dakota (July 1974); Ten-
nessee (July 1982); Texas (Sept. 1975); Utah (Jan. 1982); Vermont 
(1981/1982); Washington (1982/1983); Wisconsin (since inception); 
Wyoming (July 1981). 
Three of those states, Arkansas, Delaware, and Wisconsin, have 
used sex-neutral tables since the inception of their retirement systems. 
In another ten states, use of sex-neutral actuarial tables predates the 
imposition of such tables on state by the Supreme Court's decision in 
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Power v. Manhan.6 In Manhan, the Court ruled that an 
employer had violated Title VII by requiring its female 
employees to make larger contributions to a pension fund 
Los Angeles Dept. of Ubter & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 
(1978). The remaining twenty-four states converted after 1978. Among 
the thirteen responding states that did not use sex-neutral factors at 
the time of the survey, two states were to adopt sex-neutral factors on 
July I, 1983, and two more states were considering legislation to im-
plement such factors. See Hearings on S. 3'12 Before the Comm. on 
Commerce, Science, and Tmnsportation, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 201 
(1983) (testimony of Raymond C. Scheppach, ex. dir., Nat') Gover-
nors' Ass'n); Reaction to Norris Decision Varies Among Public 
Employee Plans, 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 453 at 1196-99 (July 18, 
1983). 
In many localities, teachers, city workers, police, and firefighters 
are covered by separate local governmental pension systems. These 
systems may or may not have converted to sex-neutral tables in the 
states listed above. In addition, some states offer voluntary sup-
plemental retirement plans. The sex-based plan challenged in Nor-
ris, for example, was a supplemental deferred compensation plan for 
Arizona state employees; Arizona's primary retirement plan, how-
ever, used a sex-neutral system. ---
Many private employers also converted to sex-neutral pension 
systems prior to Norris. According to a survey conducted by Buck 
Consultants, Inc., of 264 companies maintaining a total of 566 plans 
(including 257 companies with defined benefit plans and 309 defined 
contribution plans maintained by 2fJ7 companies), 58% of the 255 
companies with defined benefit plans offering annuity options had 
sex-distinct factors at the time of the Norris decision, but they report 
they will now convert to sex-neutral systems. In 1978, when Manhart 
was d(!cided, II% of the total number of surveyed firms were using 
unisex factors for most of their plans and for most plan purposes. 
"From the start of 1978 through early 1983, an additional 29% of the 
companies converted to unisex option factors, and 42 % of the com-
panies had converted to unisex option factors by the time Norris was 
decided, according to the survey." See Firms Plan to Switch to Unisex 
Plans in Response to Norris, Buck Survey Says, 10 PENS. REP. No. 
469 at 1688-89 (Nov. 7, 1983). Of the 2fJ7 surveyed companies with 
defined contribution plans, 41 % are potentially affected by Norris. Of 
that group, only 16% were already operating on a unisex basis when 
Norris was decided. 
6. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). As the Supreme Court noted in Norris, 463 
U.S. __ n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 3492 n. 9, all but one of the lower courts 
that had previously considered the question held that sex-
differentiated retirement benefits are no more permissible under Title 
VII than are sex-differentiated employee pension plan contribution 
rates. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n (TIAA), 691 F.2d 
1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S.ct. 3565 (1983) 
modified and ajfd, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, __ US. 
__ (1984). Retired Pub. Employees' Ass'n of Cal. v. California, 
677 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 714 F.2d 95 (9th 
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (!st Cir. 1978); 
Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp. 295 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hannahs v. New York State Teachers Retirement 
Sys., 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 5Tl (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Probe v. 
State Teachers' Retirement Sys., Tl Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
1306 (C.D. CAL. 1981); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 995 (C.D. Cal. 
1980). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f) (1984) ("It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement 
plan ... which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex"). But see 
Peters v. Wayne State Univ. 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 
103 S.Ct. 3566 (1983). 
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than similarly situated male employees in order to obtain 
the same monthly benefits upon retirement. Norris ex-
tends the Manhart requirement of sex neutrality in con-
tributions to the benefit stage. Some employers did not 
quickly comply with Manhart, and similar footdragging 
with respect to the requirements of Norris should be 
anticipated.7 
After Norris, there is no legitimate excuse for public 
or private employers who do not bring their employee 
retirement plans into compliance with Title VII. Norris 
requires all covered employers8 with employee retirement 
plans to provide sex-neutral benefits based on pension or 
annuity plan contributions made after August 3, 1983; in 
addition, under certain circumstances, discussed below, 
benefits based on contributions made prior to August 3, 
1983, should be paid on a sex-neutral basis. Those 
employers who do not quickly and voluntarily comply 
become potential targets for Title VII enforcement 
actions. 
While the decision in Norris advances economic 
equality for women and men, there are significant lirnita-
tions on its impact. The employer in Norris was required 
to provide sex-neutral payments only for those benefits 
based on pension or annuity plan contributions made 
after August 1, 1983. That ruling on retroactivity sharply 
restricts the scope of relief for active and retired 
7. See, e.g., Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 
F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In 1983, the New York City 
Retirement System announced that it would bring its system into com-
pliance with Manhart (decided in 1978), and that it would refund ex-
cess contributions, an estimated total of five million dollars, made by 
women employees during the post-Manhart period. See Money To Go 
To Women For Excess Pension Payments, Civil Service Sentinel, Dec. 
26, 1983 at 5; City Trustees Vote to Refund $5 Million to Female Par-
ticipants, 10 PENS. REP. (BNA) No.473 at 18(]7 (Dec. 5, 1983). 
Another year passed, however, before the city brought its plan into 
compliance for future contributions. In February 1985, in partial set-
tlement of relief issues, the city also agreed to equalize (for class 
members who were active employees on or before July 31, 1983) con-
tribution rates with the lower rates applicable to similarly situated 
males retroactive to April 25, 1978, the date of the Manhart decision, 
with interest. See Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 
75 Civ. 2868 (MJL), Proposed Consent Decree (Feb. 13, 1985). 
8. Title VII defines "employer" as a "person engaged in an in-
dustry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for 
each working day in each of twenty or more calender weeks in the 
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a per-
son .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Title VII also makes unlawful cer-
tain employment practices of labor organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
(2)( c ), which are defined as follows: "a labor organization engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an 
organization ... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d), and those of employment 
agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(b). 
Title VII was amended, effective March 24, 1972, to include state 
and local government employers within its coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(a) and (f). 
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employees unless the plan fits under various conversion 
and cost theories explained later.9 Another limitation 
derives from the perimeters of Title VII itself. Norris af-
fects only employer-sponsored plans, leaving many 
women who purchase annuities or insurance plans on the 
open market subject to lower benefits calculated from 
sex-based mortality tables.10 
Moreover, the Norris decision does not address the 
harsh economic realities often faced by older women. 
Retired women workers are often doubly disadvantaged 
by discrimination. First, many women are employed in 
low-wage industries and in occupations without pension 
plans.11 49 percent of men are covered by a private pen-
sion plan on their longest job compared to only 21 per-
cent of women.12 Furthermore, even if covered by a pen-
sion plan, interrupted work patterns frequently disqualify 
women from receiving pension benefits. Prior to enact-
ment of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, few women 
received pension credits for employment before the age 
of twenty five or for the years in which they worked less 
than 1000 hours.13 Divorced homemakers had little or no 
income protection and widows were left without an-
ticipated pension benefits if their spouse's plan ter-
minated on the worker's death, or if he did not elect a 
plan option providing for survivors' benefits.14 In 
9. See infra text and accompanying notes 98-103, 109-118. 
10. See infra notes 32 and 61; Comment, A Step Toward Insurance 
Equity: Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 251 (1984). Some pension and annuity industry experts are con-
cerned that the Norris decision may result in adverse selection. Men 
who will receive lower sex-neutral benefits upon retirement under 
employer-sponsored plans may elect to take their accumulations out 
of their employer-sponsored fund as a cash lump sum and purchase 
higher yielding annuities on the open-market where benefits may still 
be calculated on the basis of sex. Hager & Zimpleman, The Norris 
Decision, Its Implications and Application, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 
940 (1982-83). But see infra note 80 and accompanying text, regard-
ing relative rarity of lump sum options in defined benefit plans, the 
type of plan covering the majority of workers. 
11. About eighty-five percent of state and local workers are covered 
by pension plans, compared to about forty-nine per cent of the private 
work force. PRESIDENT'S COMM"N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF 
AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 12, 16 
(1981). On the average, public sector plans pay higher benefits than 
private sector plans. In the private sector, the largest percentage of 
covered workers is found in the highly unionized manufacturing, min-
ing, and transportation industries while the lowest percentage is found 
in the non-union service and retail trade industries, where women 
tend to be concentrated. See A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRIVATE PENSIONS 199-206 (1982). 
12. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., WOMEN AND RETIREMENT 
INCOME PROGRAMS: CURRENT ISSUES OF EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 11, 
H.R. Doc. NO. 190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979). 
13. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: 
TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY, 27-28, (1981), 
[hereinafter cited as PENSION POLICY]. 
14. PENSION POLICY, supra note 13, at 32. 
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1982, nearly 40 percent of older men and only 19 percent 
of older women had some income from pensions and/or 
annuities.15 The problems have now been addressed, at 
least in part, by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984.16 
In addition to low rates of coverage, women are 
disadvantaged by lower benefits.17 When women workers 
who are covered by a pension plan retire, they frequently 
receive pension benefits based upon discriminatorily 
depressed wages.18 So, two discriminatory factors are 
present. On top of their economically disadvantaged 
position, sex-based actuarial tables result in retired 
women receiving even lower pension benefits than 
similarly situated men. Norris merely addresses the latter 
discrimination: the application of sex-based actuarial 
tables in making benefit computations. Therefore, it has 
limited impact on the overall economic plight of older 
women. 
The factors discussed above have contributed to the 
relegation of elderly women to the very bottom of the 
15. s. Rix, OLDER WOMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF AGING, Women's 
Research and Education Institute of the Congressional Caucus for 
Women's Issues 9-10 (1984). 
16. The Act reduces the maximum age conditions, for purposes of 
participation (21) and minimum vesting requirements (18), adopts 
more liberal "breaks in service" rules for non-vested participants 
(maternity and paternity leaves are not treated as a break in service), 
and requires plans to provide automatic survivor benefits to the sur-
viving spouse of a retiree or a vested participant who dies before 
retirement, unless the spouse consents to waive such benefits. Retire-
ment Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 102 (a)-(e), 103 (a), 
202 (d)-(e), 98 Stat. 794 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of26 and 29 U.S.C.). 
17. The median private pension amount in 1976 for men was $2,060 
and for women was $1,340, while the median public pension amounts 
were $4,830 for men and $2,750 for women. See WOMEN'S STUDIES 
PROGRAM AND POLICY CENTER AT GEORGE W ASHINCITON UNIVERSI-
TY, OLDER WOMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 8-12 (1980). 
18. See generally COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
AND ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY OF BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 
(D. Treiman & H. Hartman, eds. 1981); TREIMAN, HARTMAN & 
Roos, Assessing Pay Discrimination Using National Data, in COM-
PARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 137-54 (Remick ed. 
1984); SPECIAL ISSUE: COMPARABLE WORTH, 8 WOMEN'S RTS.L.REP. 
(Winter 1984). 
In 1939, median earnings for women who worked year round, 
full-time in the experienced labor force were fifty-eight percent of the 
median earnings for men. In 1981, women's earnings were at fifty-
nine percent of the median for men. See BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, No. 673, THE FEMALE-MALE 
EARNINGS GAP: A REVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS ISSUES 
(1982). The gap is even larger for minority women. See U.S. Dept. 
of Labor News Release 84-443 (Oct. 29,1984). During a time marked 
by a dramatic increase in the number of women in the labor force, the 
wage gap has been a major factor leading to the "feminization of 
poverty." See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 
WOMEN AT WORK 28 (1983). 
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economic ladder in this country. According to U.S. 
Department of Labor statistics, in 1979, women over 65 
had the lowest median income of any sex or age 
group-$2,800. This figure was approximately one-half 
of the median income for men in that age bracket. In 
1977, the median income for women over 65 was $3,087, 
compared to $5,526 for men. More than 2.6 million 
older women had incomes below the poverty level in 
1983. While women account for only 59 percent of the 
total non-institutionalized aged population, they account 
for 71 percent of the elderly poor.19 Although Norris does 
not address these broader economic concerns, it will 
benefit many women covered by employer-sponsored 
retirement and other fringe benefit plans. 
This article is intended to help employees and prac-
titioners determine whether an employer's pension or an-
nuity plan violates Title VII, and if so, to identify the 
scope of relief which may be obtained. Part I discusses 
the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona Governing 
Committee v. Norris. Part II discusses the various types 
of pension and retirement plans, and describes how to 
identify sex discrimination in typical plans. Part ill brief-
ly addresses the more difficult question of how to remedy 
employer non-compliance, and discusses the relief issues 
raised by both retirees and present employees (with 
reagard to benefits based on post-Norris contributions 
and pre-Norris contributions) once a Title VII violation 
has been found. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 
ARIZONA GOVERNING COMMITTEE V. NORRIS. 
In Norris, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adher-
ence to strict standards of employer sex-neutrality under 
Title VII. Nathalie Norris and a class of women em-
ployed by the state of Arizona filed their case in 1978, 
shortly after the Court's Manhart decision. They charged 
that the state's deferred compensation plan unlawfully 
discriminated on the basis of sex by providing smaller 
monthly retirement annuity-benefits to women than to 
similarly situated men. The Arizona plan paid different 
sums to men and women based solely on the sex of the 
employee while ignoring such individual characteristics 
as medical history, weight, smoking or alcohol 
consumption. 
Arizona advanced a series of arguments to avoid 
responsibility for the sex-based operation of its deferred 
compensation plan. Arizona first argued that whatever 
the intrinsic illegality of sex-discriminatory annuity 
19. Rix, supra note 15, at 13. 
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payments, it could not be held legally responsible for the 
discriminatory activities of the insurance companies 
which it had selected to invest and disburse its 
employees' deferred compensation funds. Arizona also 
argued that the sex-based plan did riot violate Title VII 
because: 1) it was based on legitimate actuarial data in-
dicating that women, as a group, live longer than men; 
2) it was purely voluntary; 3) it permitted women to 
avoid the effects of discriminatory annuity payments by 
opting to receive their deferred compensation in a lump 
sum payment; 4) it left women annuitants no worse off 
than if they had purchased private annuities on the open 
market; and 5) the state had not intended to discriminate 
against women when it adopted the plan. Arizona further 
argued that even if its deferred compensation plan 
violated Title VII, it should not be required to increase 
the monthly payments of women annuitants to eliminate 
the unlawful discrimination. 
In deciding the Norris case, the lower courts held 
that none of Arizona's arguments served to validate its 
provision of an employee fringe benefit which treated in-
dividual women less favorably than individual men, sole-
ly because of their sex. The district court enjoined the 
state from carrying out its obligations under the deferred 
compensation plan through use of sex-based actuarial 
tables and ordered that future annuity payments to retired 
women employees be made equal t:o those for similarly 
situated male employees.20 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed, holding that the deferred compensation plan was 
a "privilege" of employment and a "fringe benefit," and 
therefore covered by Title VII. The Ninth Circuit rejected 
each of Arizona's attempts to evade the applicability of 
Manhart's reasoning to its deferred compensation plan, 
and upheld the relief awarded by the district court as fully 
authorized by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Manhart.21 
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, af-
firmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case 
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The 
decision was divided into two distinct parts-liability and 
relief. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion for the Court 
with regard to liability. In a disconcertingly close deci-
sion, the Court held that the retirement annuity plan 
discriminated on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 
20. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm., 486 F. Supp. 645, 652 
(D. Ariz. 1980), affd, Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax 
Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), ajfd in part and rev<J 
in part, 103 S.Ct., 3492 (1983). 
21. Norris v. Arizona Governing Corrun., 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
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With regard to relief, the Court held, as expressed in an 
opinion by Justice Powell, that all retirement benefits 
derived from contributions made after the Court's deci-
sion must be calculated without regard to the sex of the 
beneficiary. Justice O'Connor provided the swing vote by 
joining Justices Marshall, Brennan, White, and Stevens 
on the liability issue, but concurring with Justices 
Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, 
in granting significantly more limited relief than that 
awarded by the courts below. 
The significance of Norris to the development of Ti-
tle VII analysis rests in three major areas, as discussed 
in greater detail below. First, the Court reaffirmed the 
principle, most clearly set forth in Manhart, that the 
plan's explicit use of sex distinctions constituted unlawful 
discrimination on its face. Norris leaves no doubt as to 
the illegality under Title VII of explicitly sex-
differentiated employee benefits.22 
Second, the Court held that the focus must always be 
on the requirement of sex-neutral payments to individual 
employees, and not on the employer's cost of providing 
equal payments. Thus, although the employer's cost of 
prividing equal fringe benefits to women (or Blacks) as 
a group may be greater, once an employer chooses to 
provide a particular type of fringe benefit, cost is no 
defense to Title VII liability for the overt discriminatory 
provision of those benefits.23 
22. Proving the use of a sex-based classification establishes the 
employer's intent to discriminate, thus reaching the end point of Ti-
tle VII disparate treatment analysis. Compare cases of facial 
discrimination, e.g., Norris, 103 S.Ct. 3492; Manhart, 435 U.S. 702; 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1977); Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), with cases in which factual 
issues exist as to the fact of differential treatment on the basis of sex 
or race, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 255 n. 8 (1981); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567, 577 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973). 
In contrast to the intentional discrimination analysis used in 
disparate treatment cases (established either through evidence of ex-
plicit sex-based treatment or through certain factual inferences and 
presumptions in a pretext analysis), in disparate impact cases, plain-
tiffs may challenge employment practices that are facially neutral in 
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly 
on one group than on others and cannot be justified by business 
necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
23. Compare the Ninth Circuit's analysis of cost defense in a 
disparate impact challenge to compensation dicrimination in Wam-
bheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 104 S.ct. 3544 (1984) (challenge to employee medical policy 
head-of-household rule) with the Supreme Court's rejection of cost 
as a defense in Manhart. As the Court recognized in Manhart, 435 
U.S. at 718 n. 34, the sex composition of the workforce may be taken 
into account in computing the employer's cost of providing the fringe 
benefit: Title VII does not make 1t unlawful "to determine the fund-
ing requirements for an establishment's benefit plan by considering 
the composition of the entire [work]force." The difference in cost of 
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Third, although cost provided no justification for 
discrimination, the Court held that cost constitutes a 
highly relevant factor in fashioning appropriate relief for 
discrimination in pension and retirement plans. Because 
of the Court's concern regarding the sensitive long-term 
funding assumptions involved in making pension plan 
pay-outs, the Norris Court held that lower courts must 
depart from the usual Title VII practice of providing 
"make whole" relief where the cost of a retroactive 
remedy would endanger the solvency of pension plans, 
and where the employer could have believed that 
Manhart did not apply. This holding is troubling in two 
important respects. First, there were no findings below 
regarding the total cost to Arizona of equalizing all future 
benefits under the plan. The Court merely relied on 
estimates regarding the high cost to state and local gov-
ernments generally of retroactively equalizing benefits 
under such unfunded plans.24 Second, the decision per-
petuates the discrimination against women participants 
in the plan until sometime in the next century, and may 
encourage some employers to continue questionable pen-
sion practices until a court has held them unlawful. 
A. Factual Background 
Arizona established its challenged deferred compen-
sation plan in 1974 as an optional fringe benefit to pro-
providing benefits for respective classes of employees can be taken 
into account in the pay-out stage by factoring such costs into sex-
merged or "unisex" tables used to compute benefits, or by requiring 
employers themselves to equalize benefits paid to individual 
employees. 
Unisex tables have been developed for both defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans. See infra notes 82-85,87 and accompany-
ing text; see also, e.g., U. of Minnesota Adopts Unisex Plan for Pen-
sions: Right Thing to Do, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 25 Oct. 13, 
1982, at 25; Fellers & Jackson, Non-Insured Pension Mortality: The 
UP-1984 Table, Presentation at the Joint Program, Conference of Ac-
tuaries in Public Practice, Society of Actuaries 3 May 1975, at 3. The 
sex-merged or composite mortality table described by Fellers and 
Jackson is appropriate for valuation of pension plans covering groups 
having 10-30% female employees, if used without adjustment. The 
table can be set back or set forward for use with groups with a dif-
ferent male-female percentage. 
24. See Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3510. Justice Powell relied upon 
general figures in a Department of Labor Cost Study estimating the 
cost of retroactive relief for all types of pension plans-public or 
private, funded and unfunded. That study has been criticized as 
severely overstating the costs involved, and of containing serious 
technical flaws which invalidate its results. See Review of A Report On 
the Cost Study of the Impact of An Equal Benefits Rule On Pension 
Benefits, Hearings on S. 372. Before the Comm. on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, 98th Cong., lst Sess. (1983) (statement 
ofD. Grubbs, consulting actuary). Cf Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722 n. 
42 ("[W]e cannot base a ruling on the facts of this case 
alone .... [E]quitable remedies may be flexible, but they still must be 
founded on principle.") 
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vide supplemental retirement benefits to state 
employees.25 Deferred compensation plans enable 
employees to defer a portion of their taxable income until 
retirement, at which time they are, presumably, taxed at 
a lower rate.26 Such plans, therefore, are of particular im-
portance in recruiting and retaining senior or highly 
qualified employees whose salaries place them in a 
relatively high tax bracket. 
Persuant to IRS guidelines, which were substantially 
codified as Section 131 of the Revenue Act of 1978,27 
Arizona employees were permitted to defer the payment 
of income taxes not on1y on deferred wages, but also on 
the interest such deferred wages earn. IRS guidelines 
provide that in order to avoid the immediate recognition 
of income by the employee pursuant to the "constructive 
receipt" or "economic benefit" doctrines, the deferred 
wages and accrued interest may not be held in a funded 
or secured plan and must continue to be treated as the 
property of the employer.28 Employees are permitted to 
25. Arizona's Deferred Compensation Plan states its purpose as 
follows: 
... [T]he purpose of [the plan] is to attract and hold 
certain individuals by permitting them to enter into 
agreements with the Committee which will provide for 
monthly payments on retirement, as well as death 
benefits in the event of death before or after retirement. 
Norris Joint Stipulated Statement of Facts (Joint Appendix 10), Ex-
hibit 10, at 10; Exhibit 11, at 10. 
The benefits provided under the plan did not affect the amount 
of benefits an employee would receive under the state's primary 
retirement plan, which were made on a sex-neutral basis. See ARIZ. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-874A; Brief for Petitioners in Arizona Gover-
ning Committee v. Norris at 3 n. 4. 
26. For a description of the development, characteristics, and uni-
que tax status of state government deferred compensation plans such 
as Arizona's, see H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-53 
(1978), S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-65 (1978). 
When an unfunded, non-qualified plan is maintained by a 
governmental unit or a church, the plan may cover all or any part of 
the employer's workforce. Under Title I of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, and 
42 U.S.C.), other employers may maintain such plans only to provide 
benefits in excess of those permitted under qualified plans, or to pro-
vide deferred compensation for a group of employees consisting 
primarily of highly compensated or management employees. Id. 
Tl. 26 u.s.c. § 457 (1984). 
28. Unfunded, non-qualified deferred compensation plans were 
first developed by private employers as a result of Rev. Ru!. 68-99, 
1968-1 C.B. 193 and 72-75, 1972-1 C.B. !Tl, which discussed the ap-
plicability of the constructive receipt doctrine to such deferred com-
pensation arrangements. 
When, in 1972, the Internal Revenue Service issued its first 
favorable private letter ruling authorizing a state or local government 
employer to establish a non-qualified deferred compensation plan for 
all or a part of its workforce, Arizona promptly enacted ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-871-874 (1974 & 1983 Supp.) providing for a volun-
tary deferred compensation plan. See ARIZ. ADMIN. COMP. R. 2-9-01 
(1984). 
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choose an investment vehicle for t.heir deferred wages 
from among options provided by the employer, although 
legal control over the deferred wages-including the legal 
right to decline or accede to an employee's investment or 
payout preference-continues to rest with the employer 
until actual receipt by the employee. The state bore the 
cost of making the necessary payroll deductions, and of 
channelling those sums to the company designated by the 
employee, but did not itself contribute to the amount 
deferred by an employee. 
Under Arizona's plan, when a participating em-
ployee reached retirement, the employee could elect to 
receive the accumulated amount of deferred wages and 
accrued interest over time in one of three options: 1) a 
lump sum (provided on a sex-neutral basis); 2) fixed pay-
ments over a specific term ofup to 15 years (sex-neutral); 
or 3) in form of a life-time annuity (sex based). Because 
of the tax benefits associated with deferred compensa-
tion,29 and in the hope of providing a secure retirement 
income, most employees elected the life-time annuity op-
tion, which entitles an employee to receive a monthly 
payment until death .30 
When Arizona invited bids from insurance com-
panies to act as investment vehicles for its deferred com-
pensation plan, it made no attempt to assure that the an-
nuity payments to Arizona retirees would be nondiscri-
minatory.31 In fact, each of the group annuity contracts 
29. Because the principle attraction of a deferred compensation 
plan is tax savings, it will generally be self-defeating to elect a lump 
sum payment, which would be taxed on the entire amount in a single 
year. Unless an employee has only a small amount accumulated, the 
election of a lump sum payment will force the employee to pay in-
come taxes on the amount at rates at least as high (or possibly higher) 
than the employee would have paid in the absence of such a plan. 
30. As of August 18, 1978, a total of 1,675 employees were par-
ticipants in the plan, including 681 women. Of the 681 participating 
women, 572. tentatively elected an annuity option. As of the same 
date, 10 women had retired, with 4 electing a life-time annuity 
payout. Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495. 
31. The state's contract procurement documents asked the bidders 
to quote annuity rates for men and women. 103 S.Ct. at 3501 n. 19. 
32. As the Court noted, the insurance companies participating in 
the plan used different means of classifying individuals on the basis 
of sex. Several of the companies used separate male and female ac-
tuarial tables. Another company used a single table based on male 
mortality rates, but applied a six year "set back" for women, i.e., by 
treating a woman as if she were a man six years younger and had the 
life expectancy of a man that age. 103 S.Ct. at 3495 n. 2. 
The history and use of sex-based mortality tables is described in 
Note, Challenges to Sex-Based Monality Tables in Insurance and 
Pensions, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 59 (1979-80). The first separate 
women's mortality tables were deployed in England in the late 1700's, 
but were never widely adopted. In the early 1900's in the United 
States, women had trouble getting any kind of insurance, based on in-
surance companies' misconceptions about increased female mortality 
due to child birth hazards, although a 1916 study reported that women 
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entered into by the state under the deferred compensation 
plan provided for calculation of benefits pursuant to sex-
based actuarial tables, resulting in lower monthly 
payments to individual women than to individual men 
who had deferred the identical amounts of income.32 Sex 
was the only factor that the actuarial tables used to 
classify individuals of the same age; the tables did not in-
had a 12 % lower mortality rate overall, and a T/% lower rate between 
the ages of 25 and 34. Id. at 60-61. It was not until the 1950's, 
however, that insurance companies began charging women lower 
rates for life insurance based on lower mortality of women as a group. 
Id. at 61. 
Today a number of separate sex-based tables have been compiled 
for different types of insurance, such as individual life insurance, 
group life insurance, individual annuities, group annuities (pensions), 
and industrial life insurance. Id. at 61-62. nn. 31-35. Some of these 
tables are based on mortality data more than twenty years old while 
others are more up to date. Even where unisex tables have been us-
ed, they have not been used consistently. As Ms. Blevins observed in 
her Note, "In group life insurance, where women would benefit if 
sex-based mortality tables are used, unisex tables are used and 
women pay higher premiums. In group annuities where men benefit 
from sex-based mortality tables, sex-based tables are used. Hence 
women pay more than the insurance is worth in both areas." Id. at 64. 
Such discriminatory inconsistencies, formerly found fairly frequently 
in employee benefit plans, are unlawful under Title VII. 
Although insurance companies have discontinued the use of ex-
licit racial classifications in setting rates and benefits, they steadfastly 
maintain the practice of using sex-based classifications. Higher life 
insurance rates for blacks, once the custom, were also justified by in-
surance companies as "dictated entirely by actuarial findings." M. 
JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN. LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 
338 (1947). See also, e.g.' G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 
THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 316-17, 955, 
1262-63 (1944) (history of differential treatment accorded blacks by 
white insurance companies); M.S. STUARf, AN ECONOMIC DETOUR: 
A HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN THE LIVES OF AMERICAN NEGROES 
(1940); C. G. WOODSON, Insurance Business Among Negroes, in 
THE NEGRO As A BUSINESSMAN (1929 & reprint 1969) (develop-
ment of black insurance companies); G. STEPHENSON, RACE 
DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 138-140 (1910); Fellers & Jackson, 
Non-Insured Pension Monality: The UP-1984 Table, SOC'Y OF Ac. 
TUARIES 3 (May 1975)(Presentation at the Joint Program, Conference 
of Actuaries in Public Practice); Note, The Constitutionality of Racial 
Classifications in Monality Tables, 11 RUTGERS L. REv. 757 (1956). 
Risk classifications based on race (or religion) are now generally re-
jected as contrary to public policy. See Lange v. Rancher, 262 Wis. 
625, 56 N .W.2d 542 (1953) (state insurance commissioner may not 
bar blacks from state insurance program simply because statistics 
show that blacks as a group have a lower life expectancy); J. 
GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 87 (1959) 
(discussion of state statutes prohibiting race dicrimination by in-
surance companies). 
Compare, e.g., California Insurance Code §10140, prohibiting 
life or disability insurers from discriminating on the basis of race, 
religion, or national origin in the issuance of policies or in setting 
premiums for such insurance, with California Insurance Code 
§790.03 (f), which requires "differentials based upon the sex of the 
individual insured or annuitant in rates or dividends or benefits" for 
"any contract of ordinary life insurance or indivudual life annuity ap-
plied for and issued on or after January 1, 1981." See note 61, infra 
for discussion of a California amendment bringing its law into com-
pliance with Norris. 
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corporate other factors that correlate with longevity. 
Thus, despite the fact that 84 percent of women as a 
group will not live longer than their male counterparts,33 
all individual women were to receive lower monthly an-
nuity payments than identically situated men, solely 
because of their sex. 
Nathalie Norris, an employee in Arizona's Depart-
ment of Economic Security, elected in 1975 to participate 
in the plan. She requested that her deferred compensa-
tion in the amount of $199.50 per month be invested in 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company's fixed annui-
ty contract. After exhausting administrative remedies, 
Norris brought suit against the state, the plan's govern-
ing committee, and several individual members of the 
committee, claiming that the defendants were violating 
Title VII by offering an annuity plan which provided sex 
discriminatory benefits. She represented a certified class 
consisting of all female employees of the state "who 
enrolled or will in the future enroll in the State Deferred 
Compensation Plan."34 
3~. See Norris, 671 F.2d 332 n.l; Bergmann & Gray, Equality in 
Retirement Benefits, 8 Crv. RTS. Dro. 25-29 (1975). 
34. 103 S.Ct. at 3495. 
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B. The Shifting Alliances of the Norris Court 
1. Liability 
The Court's holding on the issue of Title VII liability 
constitutes a reaffirmation of the analysis applied in 
Manhart. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority on 
liability, considered first whether the state would have 
violated Title VII "if they had run the entire deferred 
compensation plan themselves, without the participation 
of any insurance companies."35 Based upon the reasoning 
of Manhart, the Court beld in Norris that the "classifica-
tion of employees on the basis of sex is no more permis-
sible at the pay-out stage of a retirement plan than the 
pay-in stage."36 The Court reiterated the basic teaching 
of Manhart: "that Title VII requires employers to treat 
their employees as individuals, not 'as simply com-
ponents of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class;'37 
Justice Marshall emphasized that Manhart "squarely re-
jected the notion that, because women as a class live 
longer than men, an employer may adopt a retirement 
35. 103 S.Ct. at 3496. 
36. 103 S.Ct. at 3497. 
37. 103 S.Ct. at 3498, quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708. 
© JEB (Joan E. Biren) 1985 
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plan that treats every individual woman less favorably 
than every individual man."38 He then applied the same 
principles to the facts of Norris, and found the Arizona 
plan to be discriminatory on its face. 
In so holding, the majority rejected Arizona's argu-
ment that the plan did not discriminate on the basis of sex 
because similarly situated men and women would obtain 
annuity policies at retirement with equal present actuarial 
values.39 Justice Marshall exposed the underlying fallacy 
of such an argument to be the mistaken assumption that 
Title VII permits the use of a sex-based classification in 
predicting longevity. Without use of the sex-based 
classification in the first place, there would be no basis 
for postulating the actuarial equivalence.4° Consistent 
38. Id. 
39. Present actuarial value is determined by multiplying the month-
ly value of the annuity by the life-expectancy (from an actuarial table) 
of the beneficiary. See Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 3497 n.11. For example, 
Norris, with a life expectancy of 79 years, would receive a total of 
$53,890.93 paid out as $320.11/month over her expected life span of 
14 years after her retirement at age 65. A man would also receive a 
total of $53,890.93, but he would be paid $354.06 per month over his 
expected life span of 12.7 years after his retirement at age 65. See 
Joint Stipulated Statement of Facts, Joint Appendix at 12, Norris. 
40. 103 S.Ct. at 3498. Actuarial "equality" by definition depends 
upon the classifications used to determine values. As explained in 
Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock, & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in 
. Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic 
Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 505, 512 (1980), it is circular to use the 
expectancies generated by a predictor to justify using that predictor. 
This may be illustrated by a simple example. 
Consider the life expectancy of a newborn black male in South 
Carolina. Prediction of his life expectancy may or may not take in-
to account his sex, race, and residence. If he is classified as a non-
white male from South Carolina, his lifo expectancy is 58.33 years. 
Ifhe is classified simply as a resident of the United States, his life ex-
pectancy is 70.75 years. The other possibilities range in between; he 
may be a non-white South Carolinian [62.64), a male South Caroli-
nian [63.85), a non-white male American [60.98), a male American 
[67.04), a non-white American [64.95), or a South Carolinian 
[67. 96]. He has eight different life expectancies-and just on the basis 
of the three predictors introduced so far. Thus, the argument that sex-
based actuarial tables are not discriminatory because they are "true" 
proves far too much, since it is virtually certain that every person 
covered can point to characteristics which actuarially demand lower 
(and higher) benefits simultaneously. 
Moreover, there is substantial debate over whether sex con-
stitutes a valid proxy for longevity. Compare id. at 539-59; Brilmayer, 
Laycock, & Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Averages as Non-
discrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 222, 236-47 (1983); with Benston, Discrimination and 
&onomic Efficiency in Employee Fringe Benefits; A Clarification of 
Issues and a Response to Professors Brilmayer, Laycock, and 
Sullivan, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 250, 771-73 (1983); Benston, The 
&onomics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits: 
Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 512-532 (1982). The 
continuing validity of the Court's decision in Norris, does not depend 
on the outcome of this debate, however. The Court held that "[t]he 
use of sex-segregated actuarial tables to calculate retirement benefits 
. violates Title VIl whether or not the tables reflect an accurate predic-
with its decision in Connecticut v. Teal, in which the 
Court rejected the so-called "bottom line" defense,41 the 
majority in Norris refused to accept Justice Powell's 
dissenting view that a neutral overall impact on the group 
justifies a policy that discriminates against individuals.42 
In exposing the fallacy of the actuarial equivalence 
argument, Justice Marshall relied upon Manhart's 
analogy to the use of race-based actuarial tables. The 
Court observed in Manhart that Title VII could not 
reasonably be construed to permit such a racial 
classification, even though actuarial studies could un-
questionably identify differences in life expectancy based 
on race as well as sex.43 In Norris, Justice Marshall 
reiterated the principle that under Title VII, a "distinc-
tion based on sex stands on the same footing as a distinc-
tion based on race unless it falls within one of a few nar-
row exceptions that are plainly inapplicable here."44 
In deeming any exceptions inapplicable, the majori-
. ty's decision, consistent with its prior decisions, iden-
tified and rejected the applicable defenses to cases of 
tion of the longevity of women as a class, for under the statute '[e]ven 
a true generalization about [a] class' cannot justify class-based treat-
ment." 103 S.Ct. at 3498. 
41. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445-56 (1982), the Court 
held 5-4 (Justice's Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor and Chief Justice 
Burger, dissenting) that Title VIl provides a cause of action to an in-
dividual denied promotion because of an employment test that has a 
discriminatory impact on a racial group even if the class of which he 
is a member has not been disproportionately denied promotion. 
42. For a discussion of the Norris majority opinion as a rejection 
of Justice Powell's attempt to import equal protection standards in-
to Title VIl jurisprudence, see The Supreme Court, 1982 Tenn, 97 
HARV. L. REv. 4, 252-56 (1983) ("By refusing to accept justifications 
that are characteristic of equal protection jurisprudence, the Court 
reiterated its determination to prohibit facial discrimination in Title 
vrr cases."). 
43. 435 U.S. at 709. See supra note 32. 
44. 103 S. Ct. at 3498. Some of Arizona's supporting amici argued 
in Norris that race should be treated differently from sex for annui-
ty purposes. Title VII forbids such a distinction. In 1972, Congress 
reaffirmed the remedial goals of both the race and sex discrimination 
provisions when it added enforcement provisions and expanded Ti-
tle VIl coverage to include state and local government employees. See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) and (t)(l982). In explaining the necessity for the 
1972 Amendments, the House Committee on Education and Labor 
observed that "discrimination against women continues to be 
widespread and is regarded by many as morally or physiologically 
justifiable." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) reprinted 
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2141. The Committee then 
specifically rejected the notion that sex discrimination is less serious 
than other forms of employment discrimination: 
Id . 
This Committee believes that women's rights are not 
judicial divertissements. Discrimination against women 
is no less serious than other forms of prohibited 
employment practices and is to be accorded the same 
degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful 
discrimination [emphasis added]. 
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facial sex-based classifications and overt compensation 
discrimination. The Court briskly rejected the exception 
for bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ)45 
"because the terms of a retirement plan have nothing to 
do with occupational qualifications." It also rejected the 
"any other factor than sex" exception recognized in the 
Bennett Amendment, 46 for the same reason it was inap-
plicable in Manhart: a scheme that uses sex to predict 
longevity is based on sex; it is not based on "any other 
factor than sex."47 Thus, the Court rejected any applica-
ble defense to a facial showing of sex discrimination. 
Significantly, the Court also reaffirmed its holding 
in Manhart "that the greater cost of providing retirement 
benefits for women as a class cannot justify differential 
treatment based on sex."48 The court noted that the post-
Manhart enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
of 1978 (PDA), in which Congress amended Title VII to 
establish that "the terms 'because of sex' or on the 'basis 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The BFOQ defense, an extremely nar-
row exception, is applicable in cases challenging the use of overt sex-
based classifications in hiring and certain employment practices, and 
by its terms is not available as a justification for discriminatory com-
pensation practices. Under the BFOQ defense, the employer must 
prove that there is a factual basis for believing that "all or substantial-
ly all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the 
duties of the job involved," or that "the essence of the business opera-
tion would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex ex-
clusively." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); see also 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
46. The Bennett Amendment, found in Section 703 (h) of Title VII, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), provides that Title VII does not prohibit an 
employer from differentiating upon the basis of sex in determining the 
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees 
of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by [the Equal 
Pay Act]. The Court has construed the Bennett Amendment as in-
corporating the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into 
Titles VII. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l976), provides in per-
tinent part as follows: 
No employer having employees subject to any provi-
sions of this section shall discriminate, within any 
establishment in which such employees are employed, 
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages 
to employees in such establishment at a rate less than 
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the op-
posite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs 
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, 
and responsibility, and which are performed under 
similar working conditions, except where such payment 
is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit 
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential 
based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, 
That an employer who is paying a wage rate differen-
tial in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to 
comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce 
the wage rate of any employee. 
47. 103 S. Ct. at 3498, n.13. 
48. See 103 S. Ct. at 3498, n.14. 
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of sex' include ... pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions,"49 buttresses its prior holding. In 
enacting the PDA, Congress was aware that requiring 
employers to cover pregnancy on the same basis "as 
other disabilities would add approximately $200 million 
to their total cost, but concluded that the PDA was 
necessary to clarify the original intent of Title VII." 50 
After concluding that Arizona would have violated 
Title VII if it had run the entire plan itself, the majority 
turned to the second part of its analysis on the liability 
issue: is the employer's conduct "beyond the reach of the 
statute because it is the companies chosen by [the 
employer] to participate in the plan that calculate and pay 
the retirement benefits?"51 Under Arizona's view, it acted 
as a mere "passive conduit" transmitting employee funds 
to employee-selected investment vehicles, and bore no 
legal responsibility for the differential in payments 
ultimately received by its female employees. Arizona 
thus attempted to shift responsibility to the life insurance 
companies which it chose as funding media for its de-
ferred compensation plan.52 
In Manhart, the Court had noted that Title VII 
"primarily govern[ s] the relationship between employees 
and their employer, not between employees and third 
parties." 53 Relying upon this limitation on the reach of 
Title VII, and the so called "open market" exception 
recognized in Manhart ,54 Arizona argued in Norris that 
it could not be held liable for the practices of insurance 
companies. The State maintained that the array of an-
nuities offered by the companies participating in the plan 
merely reflected what was then available on the open 
market. The State also argued that the availability of a 
lump sum payment upon retirement, which could be 
used to purchase annuities on the open market, also 
brought its plan within Manhart's "open market excep-
tion." The majority dismissed these arguments, and em-
phasized that an employer which offers one fringe benefit 
on a discriminatory basis, even if through a third party, 
cannot escape liability because other benefits are offered 
49. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 
Stat. 2fJ/6, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
50. 103 S. Ct. at 3499, n.14. See Newport News Shipbuilding and 
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, __ u.s. __ , 103 s. Ct. 2622 (1983). 
51. 103 S. Ct. at 3499. 
52. 103 S. Ct. at 3499-3501. 
53. 435 U.S. at 718 n.33. 
54. As the Court observed in Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18, 
Nothing in our holding implies that it would be 
unlawful for an employer to set aside equal retirement 
contributions for each employee and let each retiree 
purchase the largest benefits which his or her ac-
cumulated contribution could command in the open 
market. 
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on a non-discriminatory basis. Moreover, the majority 
emphasized that the marketplace could not define the 
lawfulness of an employer's fringe benefit plan. The 
Court stated: 
It would be inconsistent with the broad 
remedial purposes of Title VII to hold that an 
employer who adopts a discriminatory fringe 
benefit plan can avoid liability on the ground 
that he (sic) could not find a third party willing 
to treat his employees on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. An employer who confronts such a situa-
tion must either supply the fringe benefit him-
self, without the assistance of any third party or 
not provide it at all." 55 (Footnotes omitted.) 
Thus, the Court concluded that because the retire-
ment benefits clearly constituted an aspect of the employ-
ment relationship, it made no difference that the 
employer engaged tbird ~arties to provide the particular 
benefit rather than directly providing for the benefits 
itself. The employer must be held fully responsible under 
Title VII for its discriminatory fringe-benefit programs. 
In his dissent, Justice Powell relied on the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.56 The majority also addressed 
the argument that the State's plan was exempted from the 
reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
although the argument had been abandoned by Arizona 
after its rejection below by the Ninth Circuit. In a foot-
note added "to lay the matter to rest," Justice Marshall 
explained that by its own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act applies only to the business of insurance and has no 
application to employment practices.57 
Justice Marshall first pointed out that no insurance 
company had been joined as a defendant, and that the 
Court's judgment would not preclude any insurance 
company from offering sex-based annuity benefits.58 He 
55. 103 S. Ct. 3502. 
56. § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)(l982). lbe McCarran-Ferguson Act 
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance, unless such Act specifically 
relates to the business of insurance .... " 
57. 103 S. Ct. at 3500 n.17. 
58. In litigation involving sex distinct retirement benefits provided 
through the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association and College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), an insurance company 
created as an educational service organizing for the purpose of pro-
viding annuity benefits for college and university employees, TIAA-
CREF has been joined as a co-defendant in lawsuits against colleges 
and universities as an "employer" or agent of an employer within the 
meaning of Title VII. See Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1063 (TIAA-
CREF held to be an employer for the purposes of Title VII); but see 
Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (E.D. Mich. 
Im) (TIAA-CREF held an employer), i-ev'd, 691 F.2d at 238 (TIAA-
• CREF held not to be an employer under Title VII). TIAA-CREF can 
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then observed that the State itself was not engaged in the 
business of insurance because it had not underwritten 
any risks.59 Accordingly, application of Title VII would 
not supersede the application of any state law regulating 
"the business of insurance." Because that conclusion 
disposed of the issue, the Court did not decide whether 
"Title VII specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance" within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act.60 To summarize, the majority rejected Justice 
Powell's conclusion that the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
precludes application of Title VII where state insurance 
laws permit insurance companies to sell sex-distinct an-
nuities to employee benefit plans.61 
therefore be distinguished from the independent third party insurance 
companies participating in the plan at issue in Norris. See also Han-
nahs v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 26 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 527, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
59. For cases defining the "business of insurance" under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act as involving some investment risk-taking, 
see Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, (1982); Group 
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 221 (1979); 
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959). 
The Court's conclusion in Norris, that the state in providing an 
employee benefit plan was not engaged in the "business of in-
surance," is also fully consistent with the federal regulatory scheme, 
applied to most employee pension benefit plans in the private sector, 
which was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (19 ). Under ERISA, an 
employer's choice of an insurance contract as a funding mechanism 
for its employee benefit plan does not alter its identity as an employee 
benefit plan subject to the Act's requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) 
(definition of employee welfare benefit plan); § 1002(2) (definition 
of employee pension benefit plan). Moreover, in the so-called 
"deemer clause," ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(B)( ), provides that 
employee benefit plans are not the "business of insurance" for pur-
poses of state regulations. Consistent with the "deemer clause," 
ERISA establishes the regulation of employee pension benefit plans 
"as exclusively a federal concern." Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 525 (1981); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 103 
S.Ct. 2890, (1983) (state law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination is 
preempted with respect to ERISA covered benefit plans only insofar 
as it prohibits practices that are lawful under Title VII). Although 
ERISA contains no non-discrimination provision, Congress 
understood and intended in enacting ERISA that Title VII's non-
discrimination requirements applied, and would continue to apply to 
employee pension plans. See legislative History of the Employment 
Income Security Act at 1862, 3518-19 (1976). 
60. See the excellent discussion of McCarran-Ferguson Act issue 
in Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1063-1066; see also Women in City 
Gov't United v. City of New York, 515 F. Supp. at 302-06. 
61. Virtually all states permit insurance companies to sell sex-
distinct annuity policies. In April 1983, Montana enacted the first 
state statute, H.B. No. 358, effective in 1985, which would prohibit 
the sale of such sex-based policies. Under the new Montana law, it 
will be an "unlawful discriminatory practice for any financial insitu-
tion or person to discriminate solely on the basis of sex or marital 
status in the issuance or operation of any type of insurance policy, 
plan, or coverage or in any pension or retirement plan, program, or 
coverage, including discrimination in regard to rates or premiums and 
payments or benefits." See Act of Apr. 15, 1983, ch. 531, 1983 Mont. 
Laws 1220 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 49, ch. 2, pt. 3) 
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2. Relief 
Writing for a different majority on the issue of relief, 
Justice Powell held that the retroactive portion of the 
relief ordered by the district court was "unprecedented 
(eff. Oct. 1, 1985). Bills have been introduced in the 1985 Montana 
legislative session to substantially amend or repeal the statute. In ad-
dition, five states, Michigan, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Hawaii, 
and Pennsylvania, specifically prohibit (by statute or regulation) sex 
discrimination in rates or premiums for auto insurance. See generally, 
R. Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 517, 528-33 (1983); Note, A Step Toward Insurance Equity: 
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 
251, 263 (1984). 
As noted in Justice Powell's opinion, 103 S.Ct. at 3506 n. 3, at 
the time of the Norris decision, California required the use of dif-
ferentials based on the sex of the individual insured in the sale of or-
dinary life insurance and individual life annuities where they are 
"substantially supported by valid pertinent data segregated by sex." 
See CAL. INS. CODE§ 790.03(t) (West Supp. 1985). That provision 
was amended with regard to employment-related policies in 
September 1983, however, to comport with the Court's decision in 
Norris, S.B. No. 960, Section 2, Stat. 1983, Ch. 1261. Section 
790.03(t) now provides that "sex-based differentials in rates or 
dividends or benefits, or any combination thereof, shall not be re-
quired for ... any contract of life insurance or life annuity issued pur-
suant to arrangements which may be considered terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment as such terms are used in Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended." 
Proposed federal legislation which would ban discrimination 
based on race, religion, national origin, or sex in the writing or sell-
ing of insurance has been under consideration for several sessions. 
See Note, Ending Sex Discrimination in Insurance: The Non-
discrimination in Insurance Act, II J. LEGJS 457 (1984). There is no 
question that Congress may enact laws regulating the business of in-
surance as a regulation of Commerce. See United States v. South-
eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). If enacted, insur-
ance companies would be prohibited from selling policies with sex-
differentiated rates or benefits. 
The Nondiscrimination in Insurance Act (H.R. 100, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess.) introduced by Representative Dingell and numerous co-
sponsors, was reported out of subcommittee without amendment, on· 
April 20, 1983. The Fair Insurance Practices Act (S. 'J72, 98th Cong., 
lst Sess. (1983)), virtually identical to H.R. 100, was introduced by 
Senators Hatfield, Packwood, and Hollings, and referred to the Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, chaired by 
Senator Packwood. The same bill had been reported favorably by the 
Commerce Committee just before the 97th Congress, 2nd Sess. ad-
journed in 1982 (then known as S. 2204). See S. REP. No. 671, 97th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). The Commerce Committee held hearings 
on S. 'J72 in the Spring of 1983. A compromise version of the bill was 
close to resolution, but progress halted when the insurance industry 
representatives reversed their position, pulled out of all negotiations, 
and mounted a well-financed campaign against legislation. See, e.g., 
The Committee: The &ttle Over Unisex Insurance, Washington Post, 
July 18, 1983, at A-1. The following year, H.R. 100 was amended 
beyond recognition by the full House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. As amended, the bill lost the support of women's groups 
and civil rights organizations, and no further action was taken dur-
ing the remainder of the 98th Congress. Supporters of the legislation 
plan to renew their efforts in the 99th Congress. See Gray & Shtasel, 
Insurers Are Surviving Without Sex, 71 A.B.A.J. 89-91 (Feb. 1985). 
In the meantime, non-employment related sex-based insurance 
purchased on the open market can only be challenged under existing 
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and manifestly unjust."62 Although the district court had 
not ordered back payments, the Supreme Court viewed 
a portion of the future benefit payments as fundamentally 
retroactive in nature because they were based on con-
tributions made prior to the court's decision.63 Under 
Arizona's deferred compensation plan, annuity payments 
to retirees were based entirely on the employee's past 
contributions and any return earned on those contribu-
tions. As Justice Powell noted, in order to provide all 
women (present and future retirees) with the higher level 
of benefits, Arizona would be required to fund retro-
actively any deficiency in past contributions made by its 
women retirees.64 
In reaching the decision that the relief granted by the 
Court should be prospective only, Justice Powell ac-
knowledged that retroactive relief is normally appropri-
ate in the typical Title VII case. Nevertheless, he rejected 
such relief in this case, relying on the following two fac-
tors, first applied in Manhart: 1) that the employer may 
well have assumed the pension plan was lawful; and 2) 
that imposing such unanticipated costs on the plan could 
jeopardize its solvency and the employees' benefits. First, 
Justice Powell concluded that Arizona reasonably could 
have assumed, based on Manhart's explicit "open 
non-Title VII theories. See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 
v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (appeal pending) 
(use of sex-based actuarial tables by IRS for valuation purposes pro-
hibited under Fifth Amendment); Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 65 Pa. Commw. 249, 442 A.2d 382 (1982), 
a.ffd,__A.2d. ___ (l984) (insurance commissioner correct-
ly ruled that sex-based auto insurance rates constitute "unfair discri-
mination" among policy-holders in view of public policy against sex 
discrimination expressed by state ERA); National Org. for Women 
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 84 (D.C. Superior 
Court) (case filed in August 1984, challenging sex-based health in-
surance rates as a violation of District of Columbia public accom-
modations law, D.C. Code§ 1-2501 et seq.); but cf., Life Ins. Co. of 
North America v. Reinhardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979), on re-
mand, 485 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (state action not establish-
ed in Fourteenth Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 
Murphy v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 282 Pa. Super 244, 442 
A.2d 1097 (1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981) (state action not 
established for auto insurance company's rate structure). See general-
ly, Comment, Insurance as a Public Accommodation: Challenging 
Gender-Based Actuarial Tables at the State Level, 15 COL. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 227 (1984). 
62. 103 S. Ct. at 3509. 
63. Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, agreed with Justice Powell 
that when a court "directs a change in benefits based on contributions 
made before the court's order, the court is awarding relief which is 
fundamentally retroactive in nature." That is the case, Justice Mar-
shall pointed out, because the retirement benefits under Arizona's 
plan "represent a return on contributions made during the employee's 
working years and which were intended to fund the benefits without 
any additional contributions from any source after retirement." 103 
S. Ct. at 3503. 
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3509-10, n.10. 
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market" limitation, that "it would be lawful to make 
available to its employees annuities offered by insurance 
companies on the open market."65 Second, he concluded 
that the "devastating" cost of complying with an unan-
ticipated retroactive order would fall on the state of 
Arizona, and presumably other state and local govern-
ments, at "a time when many states and local govern-
ments are struggling to meet substantial fiscal deficits." 
In sum, Justice Powell could find "no justification for 
this Court, particularly in view of the question left open 
in Manhart, to impose this magnitude of burden retroac-
tively on the public."66 The Court accordingly held that 
only benefits derived from contributions collected after 
the effective date of the Norris judginent, August 3, 1983, 
need be calculated without regard to the sex of the 
employee. 
The practical effect of the Court's decision for 
members of the certified class in Norris can be outlined 
as follows: 1) retirees-women who retired prior to the 
effective date of the Court's judgment will receive the 
lower sex-based benefits for the rest of their lives; 2) 
present employees-employees who retire sometime 
after August 1, 1983 will receive a combination of sex-
based benefits (derived from their pre-Norris contribu-
tions) and sex-neutral benefits (derived from their post-
Norris contributions);67 3) future employees-only those 
women retiring sometime in the distant future, whose 
benefits are based entirely on contributions made after 
August 1, 1983, will receive the full benefit of the Court's 
ruling. 
65. 103 S. Ct. at 3510. 
66. Id. Most private pension plans must comply with federally-
mandated pension plan funding requirements under the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which was enacted 
to protect employees' retirement benefit expectations. 29 U.S.C. § 
1081-86. See supra note 57. Plans made available to state and local 
government employees, on the other hand, are exempt from ERISA's 
requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (32), 1003(b)(l). Some state and 
local governmental plans are not even fully funded, and pay retire-
ment benefits through periodic appropriations. In enacting ERISA, 
Congress determined that it would not a1tempt the restructuring of 
state and local governmental plans through federal regulation. See 
discussion of governmental plan exception in ERISA legislative 
history, H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639-48; H. R. REP. No. 807. 
93rd Cong.' 2d Sess reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4670-4756. 
67. In fact, actions subsequently taken by Arizona have resulted in 
equalized benefits for present as well as future employees. As noted 
by Justice Powell, Arizona discontinued the life annuity option after 
the district court ruled it violated Title VII. 103 S. Ct. at 3495 n.4. 
After the Supreme Court's decision in Norris, however, Arizona 
reinstituted the life annuity option retroactice to the date of the district 
court's decision. In addition, the state adopted a non-discriminatory 
life annuity option for all contributions inade after August 1, 1983. 
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In her concurring opm1on, Justice O'Connor 
reached the same result, but applied a slightly different 
analysis. She examined three criteria for determining 
when to apply a decision of statutory interpretation pro-
spectively: 1) whether the decision established a new 
principle of law, either by overruling past precedent or by 
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution 
was not clearly foreshadowed; 2) whether retroactivity 
will further or retard the operation of the statute; and 3) 
whether retroactive application would impose inequitable 
results.68 In Justice O'Connor's view, the third criterion 
was determinative and compelled a prospective decision 
under the circumstances of the case. The first two cri-
teria, under her analysis, would have permitted, but did 
not require, retroactive application. 
In examining the equities,69 Justice O'Connor em-
phasized that "[m]any working men and women have 
based their retirement decisions on expectations of acer-
tain stream of income during retirement," and that 
"[t]hese decisions depend on the existence of adequate 
reserves to fund these pensions." If a fund cannot meet 
its obligations, " '[t]he harm would fall in large part on 
innocent third parties.' "70 Thus, Justice O'Connor based 
her decision for prospective relief on the "real danger of 
bankrupting pension funds." 
In contrast, dissenting Justices Marshall, Brennan, 
White, and Stevens emphasized that one of the main pur-
poses of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion ."71 With regard to benefits attributable to contribu-
tions made after Manhart, these Justices found "no 
special circumstances justifying denial of retroactive 
relief."72 In addition, the dissenters concluded that 
benefits based on contributions made prior to Manhart 
Because Norris transferred her contributions originally invested in a 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company fixed life annuity to 
another company after August 1, 1983, she will retire with benefits 
totally equal to her male counterparts. Letter from Amy Gittler, 
counsel for plaintiffs in Norris, dated February 28, 1984 (on file with 
Ubmens Rights Law Reponer). See also discussion infra notes 98-103 
and accompanying text regarding conversion theories. 
68. 103 S. Ct. at 3512, relying on the criteria set forth in Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
69. A court that finds unlawful discrimination under Title VII 
"[m]ay enjoin [the discrimination] ... and order such affirmative ac-
tion as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, 
reinstatement ... with or without back pay ... or any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). See 
generally Manhan, 435 U.S. at 718-23; Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 442 U.S. 405 (1975). 
70. 103 S.Ct. at 3512, quoting Manhan, 435 U.S. at 722-23. 
71. 103 S.Ct. at 3502, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 
U.S. at 418. 
72. 103 S.Ct. at 3503. 
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should be equalized if the employer could have used sex-
neutral tables after the previous decision without 
violating any contract provisions. They would have had 
the district court consider on remand whether "some or 
all of the male participants in the plan who had not 
retired at the time Manhart was decided had any contrac-
tual right to a particular level of benefits that would have 
been impaired by the application of sex-neutral tables to 
their pre-Manhart contributions."73 
III. EMPLOYEE PENSION AND ANNUITY 
PLANS - RECOGNIZING EMPLOYER 
NON-COMPLIANCE 
A basic familiarity with pension and retirement 
plans makes it much easier to uncover employer non-
compliance with Norris. In general, pension plans can 
be divided into two broad categories: 1) defined benefit 
plans and 2) defined contribution plans.74 Alt)10ugh 
typical trouble spots for sex differentials depend on the 
basic type of plan, the problem comes from the same 
73. 103 S.Ct. at 3504. 
74. See generally, e.g .• U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, COST STUDY 
OF THE IMPACT OF AN EQUAL BENEFITS RULE ON PENSION BENEFITS 
(Jan. 1983) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY]; 
A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1982) at App. 
B; E. ALLEN, E; J. MELONE & J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING: 
PENSIONS, PROFITS-SHARING AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
PLANS 20-65 (3d ed. 1976); D. McGILL, Actuarial Cost factors in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 305-31 (3d ed. 1975). 
The majority of covered workers are in defined benefit plans. Ac-
cording· to the U.S. Department of Labor, approximately 65 % of the 
42.5 million active private pension plan participants in 1977 were 
covered by defined benefit plans; the remaining 35 % were covered 
by defined contribution plans. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY, 
supra, at 8-9. The majority of plans, however, are structured as defin-
ed contribution plans. Defined contribution plans accounted for 71 % 
of the estimated 451,761 private pension plans in operation in 1977, 
while 29% were defined benefit plans. 
Despite their greater number, defined contribution plans tend to 
be smaller in size, and the vast majority are supplemental in nature. 
Only about three million workers have them as their primary plan. 
Id. at 9. A substantial number of college and university employees 
have as their primary plan a defined contribution plan provided 
through TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 
and College Retirement Equities Fund), which covers over 700,000 
participants in over 3500 institutions nationwide. See 1981 TIAA-
CREF Annual Report at 5. In the public sector, only 2 % of the state 
and local employees are covered exclusively by defined contribution 
plans. 
Approximately 16% of covered state and local workers are in 
combination plans having both defined contribution and defined 
benefit features. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY, supra note 74 at 
56 n. 47. The rest are defined benefit plans. The Department of Labor 
estimates that as many as two-fifths of covered employees may par-
ticipate in more than one employee retirement plan. Typically, such 
employees would be covered by a basic defined plan plus a sup-
plemental defined contribution plan, such as a profit sharing or defer-
red compensation plan. Id. at 9 n. 5. 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER [Vol. 8: 3 (1985)) 
source: the use of sex-based mortality tables to calculate 
the actuarial value of an amount accumulated or received 
by employees under the plan. 
A. Defined Benefit Plans 
Defined benefits plans provide for payment of 
specified amount of benefits upon retirement, typically 
based upon a wage and length of service formula. A 
commonly used formula for computing the amount of an 
employee's pension benefits multiplies a percentage of 
pay over the last five years of work by the number uf 
years the employee has been covered. Other common 
formulas apply a flatdollar amount for each year covered 
by the plan, or pay retirees a specified flat percentage of 
their earnings, regardless of their length of service. 
Employee and employer contribution rates, on the 
other hand, are actuarily determined, based on predicted 
benefits payable in the future. Actuarial valuations used 
to determine contribution rates depend upon estimates of 
myriad cost factors, including 1) the characteristics of a 
plan population; 2) interest rate assumptions, and 3) ex-
penses.75 The plan population and its characteristics are 
determined by the flow of participants into and out of the 
plan (new employees, retirements, terminations, de~th, 
and disability). Traditional plan population cost factors 
include the number of participants and beneficiaries, the 
male and female mix, the attained age distribution, the 
distribution by years of service, and the level and 
distributions of salaries (if the benefits of the plan are 
related to compensation).76 
Interest rate assumptions used in the actuarial valua-
tion formula greatly affect estimates of plan costs and 
liabilities because of the long time span between benefit 
accruals and payments. As a generalization, it has been 
observed that a change of 1 % in the interest rate assump-
tion alters the long-run cost estimate of a typical plan by 
about 25 % .77 For this reason, it is common practice to 
use an interest rate assumption lower than the expected 
long-term rate of return, leading to overstatement of the 
expected cost of the plan.78 Thus, the interest assumption 
used by a plan significantly affects the actuarial valuation 
(more so than the sex mix of the plan population), and 
the corresponding funding requirements for the plan. 
The pension plan at issue in Manhart was a defined 
benefit plan. In defined benefit pla:ns, the trouble spots 
for sex discrimination are found at the pay-in stage in. 
75. See D. MCGILL, Actuarial Cost Factors:in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PRIVATE PENSIONS 305-31 (1975). 
76. Id. at 307-08. 
77. Id. at 324. 
78. Id. at 325. 
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employee contribution rates and in the pay-out stage 
where optional benefits are based on the actuarial value 
of the normal benefits.79 Discriminatory contribution 
rates have largely been eliminated in the wake of 
Manhart. However, discriminatory pay-out options re-
main a problem in numerous plans. In defined benefit 
plans, normal benefits are computed according to sex-
neutral formulas as described above. Similarly situated 
men and women choosing a "normal benefit" receive 
equal amounts. Similarly situated men and women 
choosing an optional benefit, however, receive sex-
differentiated benefits if the conversion is made with sex-
based actuarial tables. Under typical alternative pay-out 
options, i.e. , early retirement options, lump sum 
payments or joint and survivor benefits, the use of sex-
based actuarial tables results in individual men receiv-
ing lower benefits than similarly situated women. 
For example, if an identically situated male and 
female were to retire at age sixty-five with a yearly "nor-
mal" retirement benefit of $5,000, the respective present 
actuarial values of their benefits, based on sex-based 
mortality tables predicting eighteen or more years of life 
for the average man, and twenty-two for the average 
woman, would be $90,000 for the man ($5,000 x 18 = 
$90,000) and $110,000 for the woman ($5,000 x 22 = 
$110,000). The same present actuarial values would apply 
in computing lump sum payment'i ($90,000 and $110,000) 
or for calculating joint and survivor options, where the 
retired employee receives a specified periodic amount for 
life, and the surviving spouse thereafter receives a 
periodic benefit for his or her life.so The actuarial 
equivalent for early retirement for each at age sixty-two, 
still based on sex-based mortality tables, would then be 
$4,285 for the man ($90,000 ...;- 21 [18 + 3] = $4,285), 
and $4,400 for the woman ($110,000 ...;- 25 [22 + 3] = 
$4,400). If a merged mortality table were used for both 
sexes, the present actuarial value of the man's and 
79. Normal benefits are those benefits automatically provided 
under the plan. 
80. Joint and survivor annuity periodic payments also tend to be 
smaller for individual men than for sirnilarily situated women based 
on the actuarial determination that men are more likely to be survived 
by their wives than vice versa. Smaller payments for men choosing 
the joint and survivor option are exac€,:rbated by the assumption that 
the man's spouse is likely to outlive him not only because of her sex 
but also because it is likely that she is younger than her husband. 
ERISA requires covered pension plans to provide employees with a 
joint and survivor pay-out option. Currently, approximately 35% of 
married men in defined benefit plans select the joint and survivor op-
tion. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, COST STUDY, supra note 74 at 78. In 
contrast, lump sum pay-out options are not required by ERISA and 
are relatively rare in defined benefit plans. They accounted for about 
2 % of male recipients who retired in 1978. 
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woman's retirement at age sixty-five would be equal (i.e., 
$5,000 x 20 years = $100,000), and similarly, the ac-
tuarial equivalent for early retirement at age sixty-two 
would yield equal payments ($100,000 ...;- 23 = $4,348).s 1 
Fifty-five percent of private defined benefit plans in 
fact do not use sex-based mortality tables to establish sex-
differentiated optional benefit levels, according to a U.S. 
Department of Labor survey, reported early in 1983,s2 
and at least 30% of state and local workers were covered 
by plans which provide sex-neutral joint and survivor op-
tions.s3 For example, railroad retirement plans already 
provide survivor and all other benefits on a sex-neutral 
basis.s4 Numerous large private defined benefit plans 
have long offered sex-neutral joint and survivor option_s, 
including, among others, General Electric, IBM, 
General Motors and plans covering the Steelworkers and 
the United Auto Workers.ss 
B. Defined Contribution Plans 
Defined contribution plans, the type of plan at issue 
in Norris, provide for contributions of a specified amount 
each year on behalf of each employee. Future benefit 
levels are not fixed, but depend on the amount of ac-
cumulated funds at retirement (contributions and net in-
vestment returns) allocated to individual accounts. The 
amounts to be paid out in lifetime periodic benefits are 
actuarily determined. 
Under a typical contribution plan, the employer or 
employee, or both, may make periodic contributions 
equal to a specified percentage of the employee's salary. 
The employer generally sends the contributions to an in-
81. The example given is for illustrative purposes only and omits 
the role of interest in calculating present value. See Brief Amici 
Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union and American Associa-
tion of University Professors at 20 n.9, Manhan. 
Plans requiring women to retire earlier than men, or blacks 
earlier than whites, have been held unlawful under Title VII. Peters 
v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 483 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1002 (1973)(race); Bartmess v. Drewrys, U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 
1186 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971)(sex); Fillinger v. 
East Ohio Gas Co., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 73 (N. D. Ohio 
1971)(sex). In addition, plans paying lower monthly benefits to male 
early-retirees have been found unlawful under Title VII. Chastang v. 
Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Rosen v. Public 
Service Electric & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1974), rev(J on other grounds, 
519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975)(failure to award attorney's fees), affd in 
pan, rev(J in pan on other grounds, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)(failure to 
award back pay). 
82. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY, supra note 74 at 13. 
83. See id. DEPT. at 81 n. 68. 
84. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST IMPACT FOR DEFINED CONTRIBU-
TION PLANS OF OFCCP's PROPOSED REGULATION REGARDING SEX 
DISTINCTIONS IN FRINGE BENEFITS app. 2 (draft 1982). 
85. Id. at app. 5. 
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surance company which enters into a group annuity con-
tract with the employer or an individual annuity contract 
with the employee. When the worker retires, his or her 
benefit is equal to the fixed or variable annuity that can 
be purchased with the accumulated contributions plus in-
vestment earnings. In pricing annuities, insurance com-
panies typically use the factors of age, sex and an interest 
rate assumption. As in actuarial valuations in defined 
benefit plans, the interest rate assumption has a signifi-
cant impact on cost estimates in defined contribution 
plans, and constitutes a much more important pricing 
factor than the sex of the annuitant. As a safety margin, 
advance guaranteed rates are based on a conservatively 
low rate of interest. The safety margins are required 
because insurers cannot accurately predict the future in-
vestment return at the time they receive the deferred an-
nuity premiums. Benefits may in fact be based on interest 
rates in effect at retirement, if more favorable than the 
guaranteed rates. The Lincoln National annuity option 
selected by Nathalie Norris, for example, guaranteed 
Norris a monthly annuity benefit of $320.11 based upon 
3.5 % interest. (The monthly guaranteed amount would 
have been $354.06 if Norris had been male.) The Lin-
coln National contract provided that a participant's an-
nuity would be based on rates in effect at retirement, if 
more favorable than the advance guaranteed rates. 
Assuming Lincoln National based its actual annuity 
premium rates on 7.5 % interest, Norris' monthly annuity 
would be approximately $443 or about 38 % more than 
the $320.11 annuity under guaranteed rates.s6 
In defined contribution plans, trouble spots for sex 
discrimination are found at the payout stage for all life-
time annuity benefit options. If sex-based actuarial tables 
are used, a woman choosing a single life annuity would 
receive lower periodic benefits than a similarly situated 
man. Because the money accumulated in her individual 
account at retirement would be equal to that of her male 
counterpart, however, choice of a lump sum payment 
would result in equal amounts for the man and woman. 
(Lump sum payments do not pose problems in this con-
text because they are not actuarily determined in defined 
contribution plans.) Use of sex-based actuarial tables has 
historically been more prevalent in defined contribution 
plans than in defined benefit plans. The U.S. Department 
of Labor reported in 1983 that 74 % of participants in 
defined contribution plans, compared to 45 % in defined 
benefit plans, were subject to sex-based computation of 
periodic annuity benefits.s7 
86. See Brief of Eight Individual Actuaries as Amici Curiae in Nor-
ris at 9-13. 
'ifl. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, COST STUDY, supra, note 74 at 10. 
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C. Obtaining Information About An Employer's 
Pension Plan 
ERISA provides employees in the private sector with 
rights of access to information about their employee pen-
sion benefit plan. Employers are required, under ERISA, 
to give employees a summary plan description, which is 
usually provided in booklet form. Employees may also 
examine the more complete pension plan documents or 
contact the plan administrator for more information.ss 
In defined contribution plans, employees should ex-
amine the contract documents for use of sex-based ac-
tuarial factors to compute life annuity benefit amounts. 
These are easily detected if the documents specify sex-
differentiated benefits. If sex-based classifications do not 
appear on the face of the plan, there is usually a state-
ment that benefits are calculated according to a specified 
mortality table.s9 
In defined benefit plans, use of sex-based actuarial 
factors are sometimes more difficult to spot unless the 
summary plan description give sex-differentiated ex-
amples of optional benefit amounts. Nevertheless, under 
Revenue Ruling 79-90, the Internal Revenue Service now 
requires qualified defined benefit pension plans90 to 
specify the actuarial assumptions used to compute the 
amounts of optional forms of retirement benefits.91 This 
88. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1022, 1024(b)(2)(1984). 
89. See supra note 32. 
90. Pension plans that meet certain participation and vesting stan-
dards designated in the Internal Revenue Code are referred to as 
qualified plans, and receive certain tax advantages not available to 
nonqualified plans. Employer contributions to qualified plans are 
deductible by the employer when made, but not taxed to the employee 
until benefits are distributed from the plan at retirement. A. MUN-
NELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, at 215-16. 
91. See Rev. Rul. 79-90, 1979-1 C.B. 155. Under Revenue Ruling 
79-90, defined benefit plans that provide optional forms of retirement 
benefits that are actuarial equivalent to the normal retirement benefit 
must specify the actuarial assumptions used to compute the optional 
benefits. This requirement derives from Treasury Regulation 
8l.40l-l(b)(i)(l984) which requires defined benefit plans to provide 
"definitely determinable" benefits. Plans in effect on March 12, 1979 
were not required to specify their actuarial assumptions until January 
l, 1984. 
The question of whether any change in specified assumptions by 
plan amendment would violate the Internal Revenue Code's prohibi-
tion against amendments that cause a reduction in accrued benefits 
was considered in Revenue Ruling 81-12, 1981-1 C.B. 228. A sup-
plemental ruling which addressed the relationship between Revenue 
Ruling 79-90 and the anti-cutback rule in Internal Revenue Code Sec-
tion 4ll(d)(6)(1984). Revenue Ruling 81-12 outlines changes in ac-
tuarial factors that indirectly affect accrued benefits, and describes 
two methods that may be used to avoid a decrease in accrued benefits 
where a plan amendment makes such a change. 
According to the IRS, where a plan had "not yet specified ac.-
tuarial assumptions for optional benefits under Revenue Ruling 79-90 
or Revenue Ruling 81-12, it would be able to go to unisex tables 
without violating the benefit accrual provisions of the code 'as long 
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will make it easier to spot sex discrimination in qualified 
defined benefit plans. Fortunately, many plans volun-
tarily converted to sex-neutral actuarial factors in the pro-
cess of complying with the new IRS requirements.92 
IV. REMEDYING EMPLOYER NON-COMPLIANCE 
Manhart and Norris require trial courts to use 
equitable principles in determining the scope of relief 
granted in pension discrimination cases. Consistent with 
its remedial holdings in other Title VII cases, the Court 
in Manhart and Norris reaffirmed the principle that relief 
should be fashioned in each Title VII case with due 
regard for the particular facts and circumstances 
presented, but with added "equitable sensitivity" to the 
potential impact of a retroactive remedy in the context of 
pension cases. 
The Court in both Manhart and Norris recognized 
that in Title VII actions, there is a "presumption in favor 
of retroactive liability" which "can seldom be over-
come."93 In enacting Title VII, Congress intended to give 
courts wide discretion in exercising their equitable 
powers to fashion the most complete relief possible, in-
cluding "make-whole remedies" designed to restore 
plaintiffs "to a position where they would have been were 
as the assumptions stated in the plans do not change."' Issues with 
regard to plans that already specified sex~based assumptions for op-
tional benefits have been under IRS sn1dy. See IRS Will Provide 
Guidance For Pension Plans to Comply With Court Ruling in Norris 
Case, DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA), No 190, at A-I0-11 (Sept. 29, 
1983); cf Block & Cogan, Pension Strategies After Norris IO J. 
PENS. PLAN. & COMPL. 131, 138-40 (1984); Ryan & Rock, Post-
Norris Ambiguities: Unanswered Questions for Women and the Pen-
sion Industry, 17 AKRON L. REV. 171, 190 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Ryan & Rock]. 
92. As noted in Hager & Zimpleman, The Norris Decision, Its Im-
plications and Application, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 937-38 
(1982-83), the defined benefit plan sponi;or must decide whether to 
apply the principles of Norris to all ber1efits accrued to date. The 
authors point out that as a practical matter, "splitting the accruals into 
pre- and post-August 1, 1983 accruals and using different factors for 
each may be unnecessarily complicated in view of the employer's 
cost." Id. at 938. See also survey results discussed in note 5, supra; 
but see Ryan & Rock, supra note 91, at 190. Similarly, many defin-
ed contribution plans have complied with Norris by adopting unisex 
factors for account balances arising from contributions before August 
1, 1983. According to the Buck Consultants, Inc. survey referenced 
in footnote 5, of those surveyed defined contribution plans adopting 
unisex factors to comply with Norris, "70 percent will apply unisex 
factors to participants' total account balances, and 19 percent will 
apply the factors for future contributions only, while 11 percent of the 
plans had not yet decided which appro:1ch to take." Firms Plan to 
Switch to Unisex Plans in Response to Norris, Buck Survey Says, 10 
PENS. REP. (BNA) 1688 (Nov. 7, 1983). 
93. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 719, Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3502. 
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it not for the unlawful discrimination."94 In pension 
cases, the presumption in favor of retroactive relief can 
be overcome under Manhart and Norris if 1) the 
employer had reason to believe its plan was lawful, and 
2) retroactive relief would impose costs which would en-
danger the solvency of the plan, thereby jeopardizing the 
expectations of employees to their retirement benefits. 
Under these guidelines, the scope of relief that can 
be obtained depends upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case.95 Accordingly, the employer's plan should be 
closely scrutinized for the following factors: 1) whether 
the relief requested would in fact be "retroactive;" 2) 
whether the employer could have reasonably believed its 
conduct was lawful in light of Manhart, i.e., whether the 
plan offered a sex-neutral lump sum payment or was 
funded through an independent third party insurance 
company which offered annuities available on the open 
market; and 3) what impact the requested relief would 
have on the solvency of the plan and on the expectations 
of its participants. 
Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, recently decided by the Second 
Circuit, and several other cases now pending on remand 
from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light 
of Norris raise these post-Norris relief issues.96 In Spirt, 
the Second Circuit reinstated its pre-Norris judgment, 
with one minor modification, and ordered that retire-
ment benefits be equalized for all persons retiring after 
May 1, 1980.97 Although characterizing its decision as 
awarding "retroactive relief," the Second Circuit 
distinguished the TIAA-CREF plan from the plan in-
volved in Norris based on 1) the absence in Spirt of ad-
ditional financial burdens imposed on the employer by 
the relief order and 2) the fact that the participants in the 
TIAA-CREF plan had no expectation of a "certain 
stream of income" at retirement. The Spirt decision pro-
vides valuable guidance with regard to the scope of relief 
permissible in post-Norris cases with distinguishable fact 
patterns. 
94. Albemarle Paper Co v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 
(l972)(quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972)). 
95. Cf Manhart, 435 U.S. at 722 n.42; Ryan & Rock, supra note 
91, at 177-83. 
96. See Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, 691 F. 2d. 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. 
granted and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983), modified and affd, 
735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, __ US. __ (1984), and cases 
pending on remand cited supra note 6. See also EEOC v. TIAA, 84 
Civ. 9294 (RJW)(S.D.N.Y.)(complaint filed Dec. 27, 1984). 
97. The Second Circuit modified its prior decision in "one minor 
respect" as follows: 
We still consider the likelihood that TIAA will fail to 
earn 2-112 % on its investment to be an insignificant 
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A. Retroactivity 
As previously discussed,98 the Supreme Court held 
that when a court "directs a change in benefits based on 
contributions made before the court's order, the court is 
awarding relief that is fundamentally retroactive in 
nature."99 Plans should be closely examined, however, to 
determine whether any applicable conversion provisions 
transform past contributions into new contributions for 
purposes of benefit computations. In addition, em-
ployer's actions should be scrutinized for any exercise of 
discretionary authority during the post-Norris (or post-
~anhart) period to specify sex-based benefits computa-
tions. For defined benefit plans, it should be determined 
whether the plan sponsor has made a post-Norris deci-
sion to comply with Revenue Ruling 79-90 by specifying 
sex-based rather than sex-neutral actuarial factors used 
to compute optional benefits.100 A post-Norris decision 
to specify sex-based actuarial factors when the plan spon-
sor had the discretion to specify sex-neutral factors may 
also transform past contributions into new contributions. 
In sum, for both types of plans, it should be determined 
whether 1) plan participants receive post-Norris sex-
based discretionary distributions or benefit increases 
and 2) when and how retirement benefit amounts ar; 
"settled" for retirees. 
For example, the defined contribution plan at issue 
in Spirt, has automatic conversion provisions which 
arguably transform prior accumulations into a new 
' lump-sum contribution at retirement. Upon retirement 
a paid-up TIAA plan will automatically be provided a~ 
a new, advantageous rate if the single premium annuity 
available at retirement provides higher benefits than those 
guaranteed under the paid-up plan. At retirement, the 
TIAA participant surrenders to TIAA his or her defer-
r~~ annuity contract. For more than 99 per cent of par-
ticipants, the accumulation in the TIAA account is then 
used as a single lump sum to buy an annuity from TIAA 
risk .. ~~wever, since Norris appears to foreclose any 
poss1b1hty of the retroactive imposition of added finan-
cial burdens upon employers or plans we will direct the Di~trict Court to modify its judgm~nt to provide that 
umsex tables need not be used in calculating the portion 
of benefits attributable to pre-judgment contributions to 
whatever extent may be necessary in any year to ensure 
that the use of such tables will not impose added finan-
cial b~rdens upon the employer or TIAA beyond those 
resulting from the obligation to pay benefits reflecting 
a 2-1/2% return on investment. 
Spirt, 735 F.2d at 29. 
98. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
99. 103 S. Ct. at 3503. 
100. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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that will provide benefits at the higher single premium 
annuity rate.101 The variable annuity offered by TIAA's 
companion organization, CREF, contains analogous con-
version provisions.102 
There is no question that all post-Norris (and in 
some cases, post-Manhart) contributions must be used 
to purchase sex-neutral benefits. The issue raised by the 
above-described facts in Spirt is whether accumulated 
contributions which are converted to a lump sum 
premium for immediate annuities ought to be considered 
new or old contributions. A compelling argument can be 
made, and was made by the EEOC and other parties in 
Spirt on remand, that such provisions convert the 
accumulations into new contributions. Although the 
Second Circuit's decision in Spirt did not adopt this argu-
ment as the basis for its decision on remand, such an ap-
proach could have provided a justifiable alternative basis 
for the court's reinstatement of its pre-Norris judgment. 
A similar argument can be made for certain optional 
benefit conversions in defined benefit plans.103 
B. Reasonable Belief that the Pension Plan Was Lawful 
In rejecting retroactive relief in Manhart, the Court 
emphasized that it was announcing a new rule of law, and 
that conscientious and intelligent administrators of pen-
sion funds may well have assumed that their plans were 
entirely lawful because "the courts had been silent on the 
question, and the administrative agencies had conflicting 
views." 104 In Norris, Justice Powell refused to apply the 
Court's decision retroactively in part because under 
Manhart's explicit "open market" limitation, "an 
employer reasonably could have assumed that it would 
be lawful to make available to its employees annuities of-
fered by insurance companies on the open market." 10s 
Manhart put employers on notice that employer 
actions vis-a-vis retirement benefits must be sex-neutral. 
Accordingly, employer-operated plans should be required 
to equalize retroactively to at least April 1978, the date ~f 
.101: See Brief for Appellant Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
m1ss10n at 21-24, Spirt. 
. 102. !d. at 15-20.. Each contribution to CREF purchases accumula-
tion umts representing the participant's proportionate share in CREF. 
At the time th~ parti~ipant retires, the current value of all or part of 
th~ accumulat10n umts can be used to purchase an immediate life an-
nuity fr~m TIAA. The transfer is treated like a new TIAA premium. 
Alter.nallv~ly, .the value of the accumulation may be used to purchase 
annmty umts in CREF (a variable annuity which does not guarantee 
any fixed dollar amount of annuity payments). The accumulation then 
serves as a purchase price for a CREF immediate annuity. 
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
104. 435 u.s, at 720. 
. 10~. 103 S. Ct. at 3510 (Powell, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part). 
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the Manhart decision. Equalization retroactive to the 
EEOC equal benefits guideline adopted in 1972 may be 
appropriate for those employer-operated plans with both 
unequal contribution rates and unequal benefits.106 Such 
plans would have been in violation of both the Depart-
ment of Labor's "either-or" rule and the EEOC's equal 
benefits rule.107 In addition, retroactive relief may be ap-
propriate in those plans where the insurer itself acted as 
an employer within the meaning of Title VII, and should 
have known prior to Norris that its policies were 
unlawful .108 
C. Financial Impact on Pension Plans and Participants 
In rejecting retroactive relief in Manhart and Nor-
ris, Justice Powell also emphasized the devastating finan-
cial impact a retroactive order could have on the reserves 
of pension plans, and on state and local governments. 
Justice O'Connor observed that requiring employers to 
"disburse greater annuity benefits than the collected con-
tributions can support would jeopardize the entire fund" 
and that employees make retireme.nt decisions based on 
"expectations of a certain stream of income during retire-
ment." 109 
None of these considerations apply when retroactive 
relief could be obtained without changing the total an-
ticipated obligations of the pension fund and without 
diminishing the amount of benefits guaranteed to the par-
ticipants. In fact, numerous major pension plans are cur-
rently overfunded, with substantially more assets than 
needed to pay currently guaranteed benefits.110 In Spirt 
106. See Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, 515 F. 
Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 198l)(relief issues pending). 
107. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(f); see generally 
Note, Title VII and TIAA-CREF, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1230, 1261-64 
(1983). 
108. See Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1067-68. 
109. 463 S.Ct. at, 103 S.ct. at 3512 (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
110. Instead of distributing excess ai;sets to employees, some 
employers have recaptured pension plan assets for their own pur-
poses. In hearings before the House Select Committee on Aging on 
pension asset "raids" by employers, the committee expressed concern 
over an unprecedented wave of pension plan terminations involving 
reversions of excess plan assets. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration furnished data to the committee indicating that since 1980, 
104 U.S. companies have recaptured in excess of $443 million from 
the termination of 114 defined benefit pension plans. Additional in-
formation raised the committee's projected total of plan asset rever-
sions to over $1.7 billion, "designed for no other apparent purpose 
than to enable plan sponsors or their officials to strip long-established 
and well-financed plans of so-called 'surplus' assets ... " See Letter 
of Edward R. Roybal, Chairman of House Select Committee on Ag-
ing to Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Labor, (Nov. 
3, 1983) 10 PENS. REP. BNA No. 470, at 1736 (Nov. 14, 1983). See 
also Terminating Pension Plans, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1984, at 02, 
v. TIAA-CREF, for example, the Second Circuit con-
cluded in its pre-Norris decision on relief that equaliza-
tion of benefits for employees retiring after the date of the 
court's order could be calculated "so as not to change the 
total anticipated obligations of the funds." 111 With regard 
to TIAA, such relief could be achieved without reducing 
guaranteed benefits by redistributing excess investment 
return amounts paid in the form of discretionary 
dividends.112 Readjustment of CREF benefits for persons 
retiring after the date of the court's order posed no pro-
blem for the court because no reserves are established by 
CREF. As a variable annuity, CREF provides no 
guarantee of any fixed dollar payment. 
In its post-Norris decision, the Second Circuit 
reached the same result after "careful consideration of 
the majority opinion in Norris on the issue of relief." 113 
The court of appeals first emphasized that the "[p]remise 
of Norris ruling against retroactivity-that equalization 
of women's benefits requires the employer or the plan to 
pay out extra sums of money-is inapplicable to the case 
before us." 114 The relief ordered in Spirt would not 
jeopardize any expectation of a "determinable benefit" 
by imposing added financial burdens on the plan. The 
court next acknowledged that the retroactive aspect of the 
judgment would have an adverse economic impact on 
male retirees as a class because men would receive fewer 
dollars than the amounts they would have received if 
gender-neutral tables were used. However, the use of 
unisex tables would have no consequence for 60% of the 
individual male participants who chose joint and sur-
vivor options. For the remaining 40% of the men, use of 
unisex tables would mean a reduction of between 1 % and 
8 % of the benefits they would have received. Although 
"somewhat uncertain as to the meaning of the Norris 
decision" 115 because of the majority's failure in Norris 
to comment on the dissent's preferred resolution of the 
case, the Second Circuit observed that "it is difficult to 
imagine why Justice Powell's opinion was so emphatic in 
cautioning against the imposition of financial burdens on 
employers and plans if in Norris it was contractually 
possible to. make retroactive use of unisex tables and 
thereby equalize benefits without imposing any financial 
cols. 1-3 (" .. :a combina_tion of (actors-among them, the 1982-1983 
stock run-up, high interest rates, and conservative accounting pro-
cedures that value pension assets below their current market vaue-
has left most major pension funds with substantially more assets than 
needed to pay employees' current benefits.") 
111. Spirt v. TIAA, 691 F.2d at 1068. 
112. Id. 
113. Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, 735 F.2d at 27. 
114. Id. at 26. 
115. Id. at 28. 
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burdens on the employer or the plan." 116 The court then 
concluded that it saw nothing in Norris that "proscribes 
retroactive provisions simply because unspecified benefit 
levels for some male annuitants will be slightly lower 
than whatever they would have been under gender-
distinct tables." 117 The court reinstated its pre-Norris 
judgment 1) enjoining the university after June 1980 from 
contributing to a sex-based retirement plan and 2) enjoin-
ing CREF and TIAA from using such tables to calculate 
annuity benefits for persons retiring after May 1, 1980.118 
In sum, the Spirt decision provides a reasoned basis 
for distinguishing the Norris situation, where the state 
government would have been obligated to appropriate ad-
ditional funds to equalize benefits, from those funded 
plans where monies may be redistributed without reduc-
ing any participants' contractually guaranteed or deter-
minable benefits. The Spirt rationale applies to any 
funded plan where conservative interest rates have been 
used to determine the amount of guaranteed benefits, and 
where the benefits actually paid exceed the guaranteed 
amounts. 
D. Scope of Relief 
The scope of relief which may be obtained in pen-
sion discrimination cases must be analyzed with the fac-
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Spirt v. TIAA-CREF involved only deferred annuitants, i.e. 
those in the pay-in stage of the plan, and did not include any person 
who had retired prior to the effective date of the district court's judg-
ment, May 1. 1980. The EEOC has subsequently filed an action 
against TIAA seeking relief for those persons retiring prior to May 
1980. See EEOC v. TIAA, Civ. Action No. (RJW) (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
119. Consistent with the equitable principles outlined in Norris, 
post-Manhart or post-Norris discretionary increases to retirees 
should be made on a sex-neutral basis. Many pension plans have 
made benefit increases to retirees over the last ten years. In a recent 
study, Inflation and Pension Benefits, of a random sample of defin-
ed benefit private pension plans, the North Carolina State University 
for the Department of Labor concluded that substantial benefit in-
creases were paid to retirees in defined benefit plans during the period 
1973-1979, especially among larger pension plans. The mean pension 
benefit for persons already retired in 1973 increased from $2,128 in 
1973 to $2,638 in 1979, an increase of 24 % . The annual rate of in-
crease during the period ranged from 2.9 to 4.5%. See Retiree 
Benefits Unable to Keep Pace With Inflation in 1970's, Study Finds, 
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No.24 at A-5-6 (Feb. 6, 1984). A November 
1981 research survey of 95 companies entitled Pension Increases For 
Retired Employees by Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby found that 
most pension increases (83 % ) were funded through the qualified 
plan. Only 3 % of the companies reported having automatic, annual 
increase provisions, and these provisions limit increases in any one 
year to 3 % or 4 % . Median increases for representative pensioners 
who retired January 1, 1975 ranged between 12 % and 19 % . The top 
10% of the survey group increased pensions by 30% or more since 
1975. Id. at 2-3. 
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tors described above, and also according to the 
employee's status as a retiree, present employee, or new 
employee. 
1. Retirees 
Whether relief can be obtained for retirees will de-
pend upon the date of retirement, when computations for 
determining the amount of benefits to be received by the 
retiree are made, and whether the retiree receives in-
creases in benefits or discretionary dividends. 
For example, if an employee retires after the effec-
tive date of the Norris decision and the employer then 
· purchases a sex-based single premium immediate annui-
ty for that employee, full relief should be obtainable. The 
single premium annuity would be purchased by a post-
Norris contribution. Relief should also be sought where 
post-Norris (or post-Manhart) dividends or other non-
guaranteed benefits are paid to retirees, whether they 
retired before or after Norris. On the other hand, if the 
employee retired before the date of the Manhart decision, 
and the full amount to be received at retirement was con-
tractually determined at that time, and no increases or 
dividends have been distributed by the plan during retire-
ment, it will be virtually impossible to obtain relief. 
Other possibilities lie between these extremes. Post-
Norris discretionary increases to retirees should be made 
on a sex-neutral basis.119 In addition, it is possible that 
relief for post-Manhart retirees may be obtained for that 
portion of benefits attributable to post-Manhart contribu-
tions if the employer could not reasonably have believed 
the sex-based plan was lawful, and for benefits based on 
pre-Manhart and pre-Norris contributions under the 
conversion120 and cost121 theories outlined above. 
2. Present employees 
Whether full relief for present employees may be 
obtained depends on when the contributions are made 
and when the computations for determining the amount 
of benefits to be received upon retirement are finally 
made. Benefits based on post-Norris (and possibly post-
Manhart) contributions must be equalized. Whether 
relief can be obtained for pre-Norris or pre-Manhart 
contributions depends on the resolution of the issues 
discussed above.122 Some pension and annuity experts 
120. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra discussion accompanying notes 98-118. In Spirt v. 
TIAA-CREF, supra note 96, for example, the Second Circuit granted 
full relief for all present employees. Upon retirement, equal benefits 
must be paid, including those benefits based on contributions made 
Heen/SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PENSIONS AFTER NORRIS 175 
have predicted that it may be "unnecesarily complex" to 
split pre- and post-Norris contributions, implying that it 
may be more economical for employers to simply make 
plans uniformly sex-neutral.123 
The issue of whether equalization of benefits means 
paying the benefits at the more favorable rate, "topping 
up," or paying them at a level determined by a weighted 
average, "mid-pointing," was not explicitly resolved by 
the Court in Norris. In Manhart, the Supreme Court sus-
tained the lower court's injunction prohibiting the 
employer from charging women the formerly applicable 
higher contribution rates,124 there.by tacitly approving a 
prior to Norris and Manhart. The Spin judgment and order, entered 
by the district court in December 1984, contains compliance provi-
sions agreed upon by the parties in a negotiated settlement of 
previously unresolved relief issues. The compliance provisions re-
quire TIAA-CREF to apply a sex-neutral TIAA dividend f~rmula for 
all persons retiring after the implementation date of January l, 1985. 
(The "dividend formula" is used to compute total TIAA benefits for 
virtually all retirees except in the very unlikely eventuality that total 
earnings would fall below a certain minimum level, in which case the, 
original guarantees would apply.) TIAA-CREF is also required to 
compute on a sex-neutral basis the number of CREF annuity units for 
all CREF annuities issued after May 1, 1980. For those persons who 
retired with "less favored" TIAA or CREF sex-based benefits bet-
ween the effective date of the original district court judgment, May 
1, 1980, and the implementation date of January 1, 1985, "topping 
up" is required. The agreement provides that the "aggregate of any 
such underpayments, without interest, will be paid by TIAA and/or 
CREF to each annuitant under such less favored annuity on January 
l, 1985 or as soon as practicable thereafter." The agreement applies 
quite broadly to all payout annuities issued on or after May 1, 1980 
arising from "deferred annuity maturitie..~," including tax deferred an-
nuities and supplemental retirement annuities, single premium im-
mediate annuities, CREF transfers to TIAA (and TIAA life insurance 
proceeds transferred to CREF), Group Annuity transfers, pre-
retirement deaths under deferred annuities, and from deaths, matured 
endowments and cash surrenders under TIAA life insurance con-
tracts. See Spirt v. TIAA-CREF, 74 Civ. 1674 (RJW), Judgment and 
Order (Dec. 5, 1984). 
In Women in City Gov't. United v. City of New York, the par-
ties recently agreed to a proposed partial settlement of relief issues 
which will provide equal benefits to all Class members who were ac-
tive members of the New Uork City Retirement System as of July 31, 
1983. The relief provided under the consent decree includes equaliza-
tion of all retirement allowances and death benefits applicable to the 
settling class plaintiffs with those of similarly situated males from the 
date of each such plaintiffs retirement, with interest. The agreement 
also provides that such equalization will be accomplished at levels at 
least as favorable as the most favorable level currently available to set-
tling class plaintiffs or similarly situated males, i.e. "topping up" to 
the male level. See Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 
75 Civ. 2868 (MJL), Proposed Consent Decree (Feb. 13, 1985). 
Relief issues involving retirees have not yet been resolved, although 
they were under negotiation in mid-February 1985. 
123. See Hager & Zippleman, 1he Norris Decision, Its Implica-
tions and Applications, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 937 (1982-83) 
[hereinafter cited as Hager & Zimpleman]. 
124. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 553 F.2d 
581, 583 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated on otlier grounds, 435 U.S. 702, on 
remand, 577 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1978). 
"topping up" remedy. The four dissenters in the Norris 
decision on relief explicitly approved a "topping up" 
remedy by stating that "there is no unfairness in requir-
ing [Arizona] to pay retired female employees whatever 
the sum is necessary each month to bring them up to the 
benefit level that they would have enjoyed had their post-
Manhart contribution been treated in the same way as· 
those of similarly situated male employees.125 In the ma-
jority's decision on relief, Justice Powell does not ex-
plicitly indicate the proper method of equalization. 
However, because relief was limited to prospective 
equalization in large part due to the asserted high cost of 
a "topping up" retroactive remedy, the majority's deci-
sion contains the implicit assumption that "topping up" 
would hav~ been the applicable remedy.126 Only Justice 
O'Connor rejected "topping up" and adopted "mid-
pointing" as the appropriate method of equalization.127 
Where retroactive relief is applicable, and where 
employees have a protectable guarantee of a particular 
level of benefits, the "topping up" method of equaliza-
tion may be the mandatory remedy.128 In some cases, 
'· however, "mid-pointing" may result in benefits at the 
same level, or higher, than guaranteed levels. This can 
occur where favorable investment experience permits the 
plan to make discretionary distributions in excess of the 
interest rate assumed or specified in the guaranteed 
benefit computation formula. It should be noted that the 
Equal Pay Act forbids employers from remedying equal 
pay violations by reducing the wage rate of any 
employee. Although the same rule should also apply to 
Title VII, and may be incorporated through operation of 
the Bennett Amendment, the Supreme Court has not yet 
resolved the application of the rule in the pension con-
text. Practitioners should therefore consider including 
Equal Pay Act claims in addition to Title VII claims 
when challenging sex discrimination in pension plans.129 
125. 103 S.Ct. at 3503. 
126. 103 S.Ct. at 3510 n.ll; see Spirt v. TIAA, 735 F.2d 23, 26. 
127. 103 S.ct. at 3512 n.4. 
128. See discussion of Spirt and Ubmen in City Gov't United, supm 
note 117. 
129. See supm note 46. However, in her concurring opinion in Nor-
ris, Justice O'Connor, 103 S.Ct. at 3512 n. 4, questioned the applica-
tion of the Equal Pay Act proviso to pension discrimination claims. 
Nevertheless, as noted in Block & Cogan, Pension Strategies After 
Norris, 10 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMP at 147, because "there is uncer-
tainty as to whether the Equal Pay Act prohibits the reduction in 
benefits of the favored class in order to bring a plan into compliance 
with the Act," the topping up approach "has the salutory effect of 
eliminating the danger of a retroactive award being imposed against 
an employer." But see Ryan & Rock, supm note 91, at 183-91 (relies 
on Department of Labor Cost Study (see supm note 74) to compare 
costs of "topping up" and "midpointing," but fails to consider 
distribution of excess plan assets, in arguing against retroactive 
equalization of benefits). 
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3. New employees 
All benefits based on post-Norris contributions must 
be equalized, and therefore new employees must receive 
sex-neutral benefits at retirement. 
scrutinzed closely for distinguishing features so that the 
most complete and appropriate remedies may be ag-
gressively sought under the principles established in 
Norris. 
The reasoning of the Norris decision logically ex-
tends to a range of employee fringe benefits, such as life 
insurance, medical coverage and disability insurance 
plans. Therefore, the analysis applied in Norris would 
also prohibit any employer-sponsored fringe benefit 
which makes sex-differentiated payments based on 
sex-differentiated actuarial data.13° Because the impact 
of Norris is limited to employer-sponsored pension and 
insurance plans, however, progress in the passing of 
legislation designed to prohibit sex-differentiation in 
open market insurance plans remains vitally important 
as a means of ensuring economic equality for women.131 
V. CONCLUSION 
Norris demarcated employer liability under Title VIl 
for payment of sex-differentiated pension benefits. 
Although Norris applied equitable factors in denying 
retroactive relief, it remains to be decided by the Court 
whether such relief is an appropriate remedy in factually 
distinguishable pension discrimination cases. The Se-
cond Circuit has decided in Spirt v. TIAA-CREF that 
retroactive relief may be appropriate where such relief 
poses no financial burden on the employer or plan, and 
where it would not jeopardize any expectation of retirees 
to a determinable benefit. Accordingly, in determining 
the scope of relief obtainable, pension plans should be 
130. Hager & Zimpleman, supra note 118, at 941-42. 
131. See supra note 61. 
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